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Introduction: The Evolution of (Modern) Biopolitical Analysis: An Overview 
The early 1 8th century witnessed not only what Foucault deemed the "birth of 
biopolitics," but also-as has been well regarded since at least the 1957 publication of 
Ian Watt's famous study-The Rise of the Novel. Current trends in biopolitical literary 
analysis predominantly focus on contemporary literature, such as Arne De Boever's 
Narrative Care: Biopolitics and the Novel (20 13), Christopher Breu's Insistence of the 
Material: Literature in the Age of Biopolitics (2014), and Michael R. Griffith's 
Biopolitics and Memory in Postcolonial Literature and Culture (2015). Largely the result 
of the trauma that followed totalitarian regimes and two subsequent World Wars, the 201h 
century featured critically acclaimed dystopian works, such as Aldous Huxley's Brave 
New World ( 1932), George Orwell's 1984 ( 1 949), and Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 
(1 953), that clearly, though hyperbolically, illustrate biopolitical thought in terms of 
population management and regulative, disciplinary control. 
A striking example of the latent dangers of what Foucault termed "biopower"­
"numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and 
the control of populations" (The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 140)--<lystopian literature 
marketed to young adults (YA literature) has exploded in popularity over the past decade, 
most of which has been successfully adapted to high-grossing films that speak to 
audiences of all ages, particularly regarding common feelings of existential anxiety, 
frustration at radically skewed power relations, and the chaos that will inevitably ensue if 
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society's globally destructive course does not change.1 But how can we expand our 
understanding of the biopolitical aspects of literary studies? In my thesis, I show, through 
Roberto Esposito's formulations, how modern biopolitical logic was solidified as early as 
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan ( 1 651), roughly 100 years before Foucault's postulation, as 
well as the ways in which the novel emerged from and critiques biopolitics. 
I argue that we can learn in depth the ways in which Foucauldian biopolitics and 
the novel are rooted in the same regulatory logic by focusing more on contemporaneous 
literature written during its development-particularly the writings of Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke-in tandem with the evolving genre of the novel. In what Daniel Defoe 
presents as an authentic autobiographical account of the Surprizing Adventures of 
Robinson Crusoe ( 1 7 1 9), considered the first English novel, Defoe clearly shows the 
influence ofThomas Hobbes' Leviathan ( 1651)  and John Locke's "Two Treatises" 
( 1689), the combination of which, as I will show in Chapters One and Two, forms the 
basis of biopolitical governance in terms of the gradual integration of sovereign rule with 
more individualistic notions of property rights and liberties guided by "Enlightenment" 
ideals, which, as Roberto Esposito, Jacques Derrida, J.M. Coetzee, and, to some extent, 
Giorgio Agamben point out, are guided by problematic, (self-negating) "immunitary" 
logic. 
1 One can even say that the genre of science fiction itself emerged from the anxieties of an increasingly 
regulated world where intruders often threaten the very fabric of existence. Zombies, vampires, and 
monsters of all sorts, one can argue, also spring from a common notion of fear-of the "other's" 
contagion, of shameful exclusion, and of the horrifying results of technological advancement fueled by 
intellectual hubris, as in Mary Shelly's Frankenstein. 
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Defoe's biopolitical critique of England's preventive measures during the plague 
of 1 665, as well as its counterproductive, forc.ed quarantine of people in their homes 
illustrates the necessity of preventive measures for all, not just those with the (monetary) 
means of survival. And, in Foe and "He and His Man," J.M. Coetzee's critiques of 
authorial representation-specifically regarding Defoe's style of vicariously assuming the 
identity of Robinson Crusoe-represents the biopolitical aspects of the novel in terms of 
the regulative management (scripting) of subjects (characters) who, in the case of Defoe's 
timeless tale, take on a mythologically laden life of their own. 
"Biopolitics" is undoubtedly a thriving field of investigation in the twenty-first 
century, though it has a much longer history. In 1911, G.W. Harris first used the term in 
an inflammatory essay, appearing in The New Age, aimed at European States' duty to 
address various issues of population management and general blunders of democratic 
leadership. Harris defined "bio-politics" as "a policy which should consider two aspects 
of the nation . . .  [:] the increase of population and competition . . .  [and] the individual 
attributes of the men who are available for filling places of responsibility in the State" 
(197). Harris suggests exterminating the "lunatics," criminal or otherwise, in the "State 
Lethal Chamber" whom experimentation fails to remedy and was a steadfast advocate for 
abortion, as is evident in the following passage, presented in its entirety: 
[T]he absurd procedure adopted at the present time in the case of the 
production of abortion should be abandoned. If a woman is with child and 
does not want it, it is impossible to see why, when at her request a doctor 
undertakes an operation at present called illegal, he should not only be 
permitted but actually empowered to do so. The production of illegitimate 
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children is one of those phenomena which will always occur so long as the 
law stands as it is, and there can be little doubt that bastardy is not only a 
great hindrance in life, but is also liable to swell the numbers of those 
who, for want of something better to do, turn their hands to crime and 
other ignoble pursuits. ( 1 97) 
Harris' "solutions" to a disorderly nation-promoting doctor-empowered abortion in an 
attempt to limit criminality and his suggestion to eradicate the mentally unfit, including 
the asymmetrical influx of "hysterical" women to any general populace-exemplify 
Foucault's notion of biopower, which he viewed as "the set of mechanisms through 
which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political 
strategy, of a general strategy of power" (Security, Territory, Population 1 6). 
Biopower operates within a disciplinary apparatus that ensures the management of 
populations in both scientific and political terms, "as a biological problem and as power's 
problem," and Foucault traces its emergence "not at the level of political theory, but 
rather at the level of [interrelated] mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power" 
(Society Must Be Defended 252). According to Foucault, a disciplinary apparatus of 
controlling individuals within society (the "anatamo-politics of the human body") merged 
with the self-subjectivizing "biopolitics of the population," as the Sovereign right to "take 
life" or "let live" was not replaced, but integrated with biopower, which "foster[s] life or 
disallow[s] it to the point of death" (The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 138). In other words, 
Power would no longer be dealing with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it 
would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level 
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of life itself: it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, 
that gave power its access even to the body. (The History of Sexuality Vol 
1 1 42-43) 
Rather than inherently oppressive, disciplinary techniques are ultimately used as a means 
of optimizing the collective life of a population, as Foucault explains: modem biopower 
"exerts a powerful influence over life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and 
multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations" (The Histo1y 
ofSexuality Vol. 1 135). 
In contrast to biopolitical governance, Hobbes noted the absurdity of a Sovereign 
regulating the corporeal subjectivity of a populace, "For if wee take Liberty in the proper 
sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, and it were 
very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy" 
(Leviathan 264). Hobbes assumes "corporall Liberty" for all who abide by the 
Sovereign's juridico-legal power to kill, so long as the Sovereign honors the obligation of 
security. The subject's liberty resides, for Hobbes, "only in those things, which in 
regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, 
and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own 
diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit: & the 
like" (Leviathan 264). Hobbes never imagined one's home, diet, and care of oneself and 
one's family would or could be regulated-nor would be of any interest-to the 
Sovereign. Contrary to sovereignty, biopower works through norms rather than laws and 
is programmatically dispersed throughout society rather than located in a single 
governing body. 
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A series of important thinkers-Jacques Derrida, Roberto Esposito, Giorgio 
Agamben, Agnes Heller, and Donna Haraway to name a few-have expanded on 
Foucault's analysis, such that we now witness a burgeoning interest in the relationships 
belween conlemporary literature and biopolitics. However, the so-called.first novel, 
Robinson Crusoe highlights the immunitary logic that forms the basis of utopian ideals, 
later sensationalized in contemporary dystopian novels to show the ways in which, as 
Derrida shows in The Beast and the Sovereign, fear and violence are the bedrock of 
governance, however veiled by platitudinous rhetoric. The "bio-political" implications in 
the work of Locke, Foucault, Esposito, Agarnben, and Derrida have particularly helped 
further expose the consequences of ideologically fusing the political with the biological 
that have resulted in preemptive attempts to localize perceived dangers to (what is 
delimited to become) the homogenous social body.2 
In his lecture series at the College de France, Foucault first mentioned biopower 
and biopolitics in Society Must Be Defended ( 1 975-76) and, in 1 978-79, further identified 
a "birth of biopolitics" taking place in the early 1 8th century ( 1740s), though these 
lectures remained unpublished in English until 2008. The steadily increasing breadth of 
work that has since elaborated on Foucault's research illustrates the relevance of 
biopolitical analysis to numerous fields of inquiry, including political science and 
philosophy, history, economics, and of course, literary studies, which incorporates 
cultural, gender, ethnic, and postcolonial analyses, to name a few. Foucault hypothesized 
2 The ideological fusion of the biological and political is evident in words like "body politic," "head of 
state," "corporation," "the motherland/fatherland," and of course, "immunity." Esposito and Derrida's 
immunological analyses, as well as Rene Girard's anthropological investigation into sacrtftctal rights, is 
essential for deconstructing the paradoxically self-destructive nature of communities. 
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that a new government rationality (governmentality), whose "objection is no longer to the 
abuse of sovereignty but to excessive government," was developed throughout the 17th 
and l 81h centuries. The gradual integration of sovereignty (rule by the sword) to 
governmentality (rule by veridiction) was made possible by "political economy," a "form 
of rationality that made possible the self-limitation of governmental reason," and in a 
broader sense, "includes any method of government that can procure the nation's 
prosperity" ( 13). 
Giorgio Agamben's analysis consists of examining the "ex-ceptional" way in 
which sovereignty operates on the same principle as "homo sacer" (sacred man). 
Agamben's central thesis in Homo Sacer ( 1 998) rests upon an obscure example of 
Ancient Roman law, wherein a person who committed a particularly atrocious crime 
could be stripped of citizenship, barred from society, and killed but not ritualistically 
sacrificed, hence reduced to homo sacer (sacred man). The inception of law dictated the 
necessity to decide who is included in the political order, thus able to attain bias (a 
politically qualified life) and who may, at any time, be reduced to zoe (those who are 
excluded from the juridical order: due process, a hearing, legal representation, the right to 
protest), or what Agamben, borrowing the term from Walter Benjamin, calls "bare life." 
Just as the structure of sovereignty is the exception-"the 'originary' structure in 
which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it" (28)-the "sacred man" 
is included in the law by way of his trial, sentence, and exclusion from sacrifice, while at 
the same time purged from society, stripped of citizenship, and deemed juridically 
killable. Agamben uses Jean-Luc Nancy's term, "ban" to refer to the "relation of 
exception[,]" in which the law maintains itself "in its own privation . . .  to apply in no 
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longer applying" (28). Those who are banned, Agamben suggests, are "abandoned" by 
the law on the indistinguishable threshold between life and law, so much so that it is 
unclear whether the banned are inside or outside of the juridical order. Agamben posits 
that since the emergence of totalitarian regimes in the 20'h century, the state of exception 
is steadily becoming the rule, as "exception and example are correlative concepts that are 
ultimately indistinguishable" (22) and become especially complicated when designating 
the commonality of individuals-that is, who is considered inside (politically qualified 
with citizenship, personhood, and the legalized right to live) as opposed to outside 
(devoid of a politically qualified identity) and vice versa. 
Although Derrida harshly critiqued the methodology of biopolitical thought, 
specifically Agamben's theoretic split between zoe and bias, his later research reveals 
"iterable" traces of an originary nature within the logic of biopolitics. In the context of 
9/1 1 ,  Derrida discusses the autoimmunitary nature of democracy and nation-states, which 
sheds light on my analysis of Robinson Crusoe; as Defoe's homo economicus, Crusoe 
views everything in terms of production value, risk, and fear-induced protection, the 
capitalist-based logic of reasoned bookkeeping imprinted in his psyche, even regarding 
spiritual conundrums. The principle of autoimmunity mirrors the paradox of the 
pharmakon (paralleling Rene Girard's notion of a "sacrificial crisis" and Esposito's, of an 
"immunitary crisis") at once both poison and cure, the concept of which Derrida explores 
in his deconstructive reading of Plato's Phaedrus in "Plato's Pharmacy." Destroying 
one's self (including one's protective measures) in the name of self-protection is the 
essence of autoimmunity-a "quasi-suicidal" act. 
9 
For Derrida, democracy has both beneficial and self-destructive patterns 
inherently marked in their very logic, representing futurity, a "democracy to come," 
meaning it functions upon the notion of"perfectability" and is guided by international 
law and institutions; it is not rational to think our idealistic depictions of absolute 
equality, morality, and the like will ever come to fruition-all idealizations are in a 
constant state of what Derrida calls disinterrance, that is, destined to err, wander, never to 
be realized. However, inherent in the very notion of quixotic tenets of democracy, there 
exists the terror of the threat of what is to come, evident in the wake of a tragic event such 
as 911 1 .  Derrida shows the ways in which the unforeseeable nature of elusively 
anonymous threats to what are justified as socio-culturally superior notions of ethical 
perspectives fuels the paranoia which targets everyone as a potential threat. When the 
power of sovereignty is threatened, it doubles its retaliatory efforts, and in the case of an 
unforeseeable force, further extends its regulative measures on its own populace. 
While, in The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault proposes the advent of biopolitical 
rationality, with neoliberalism at its root, arising approximately in the late 17th to mid-
l 81h centuries, Esposito posits the emergence of modern biopolitics roughly 1 00 years 
earlier with "the immunizing features of sovereignty, property, and liberty as they emerge 
in the writings of Hobbes and Locke" (Bios viii), showing the ways in which the 
preoccupation with self-protection inherent in all societies and individuals-"with respect 
to environmental or interhuman contamination" (Esposito Interview 5 1  )-peaked during 
the late l 61h to early 171h century with the decline of sovereign rule. Deconstructing the 
etymological root of "community" through the lens of "immunity," Esposito highlights 
the inherent antinomic tension of society in terms of individuality versus a collective 
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identity by showing how immunity (in both the juridical and medical sense of protection 
or exemption from the law and infection, respectively) both protects and negates life. 
I llustrating that immunitas generally has a negative connotation, while communitas is 
considered positive, Esposito points out that both immunitas and communitas derive from 
the term, munus, which in Latin signifies "gift," "office," and "obligation" to highlight 
the ways in which 
what safeguards the individual and social body is also what impedes its 
development, and beyond a certain point risks destroying it . . .  He is 
immune who is safe from obligations or dangers that concern everyone 
else, from the moment that giving something in and of itself implies a 
diminishment of one's own goods and in the ultimate analysis, also of 
oneself. (Esposito Interview 51) 
Like Agamben, Esposito uses Walter Benjamin's concept of "bare life" to show 
the ways in which immunity paradoxically negates life to protect it: "The excessive 
immunization of life leads to the "the sacrifice of the living, that is, of every qualified 
form of life, motivated by simple survival: the reduction of life to its simple biological 
layer" (51 ). But unlike Agamben, the anti-statist, or Derrida, who focuses on the self­
destructive aspects of immunity, Esposito envisions a positive transference of negative 
forms of societal immunization to a de-biologized form of political ideals that evoke, as 
Timothy Campbell describes it, a "radically 'communtized' life" (Bias Intro: xiii). While 
such a transformation may be unattainable, Esposito's analysis highlights the merits of 
investigating the biopolitical aspects of the l 81h century English novel. My thesis shows 
the ways in which Defoe's works, particularly Robinson Crusoe, Serious Reflections, and 
A Journal of the Plague Year highlight the germs of Foucauldian biopolitics and what 
Esposito calls the immunitary paradigm. 
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The politicization of the body in the form of property is the focus of Chapter One, 
where I explicate Robinson Crusoe through the lens of Locke's conception of property, 
showing the ways in which Crusoe's self-regulated project of "improvement" illustrates 
Roberto Esposito's immunological critique of Lockean property rights. In Chapter Two, I 
show how Crusoe's proprietary logic reflects Esposito's and Derrida's theorizations of 
immunity and autoimmunity-the self-negating principles of protection that permeate the 
logic of security. In Chapter Three, I show the ways in which Foucault's theorizations 
about the bedrock of "Liberal," biopolitical governance (governmentality, veridiction, 
and competitive optimization) are crystallized in Robinson Crusoe and A Journal of the 
Plague Year, both of which Defoe boasts as authentic narratives. While Robinson Crusoe 
is a symbolic representation of solitude and imprisonment, merely loosely based on 
Alexander Selkirk's experience marooned on an island, A Journal of the Plague Year 
convincingly merges fact and fiction, as much of the substance of Defoe's tale has been 
authenticated by historians, both of statistical facts and into the nature of humanity in 
times of mass panic and death. 
Chapter One: Crusoe's Biopolitical Project: Proprietary Sovereignty in/of the 
Person 
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"The first working, enclosing, or, in general, transforming of a piece of land can 
furnish no title of acquisition to it . . .  "-Immanuel Kant 
I now turn to an analysis of Robinson Crusoe through the lens of Locke's "On 
Property" to illustrate the biopolitical basis of Defoe's novel. Widely regarded as the first 
English novel, Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe was published in 17 19, just thirty years 
after John Locke's Two Treatises of Government. In his highly acclaimed works The Rise 
of the Novel and "Robinson Crusoe as Myth," Ian Watt references Robinson Crusoe in 
terms of Crusoe's emulation of a Lockean, individualist nature nurtured through an 
empirical method of both capitalistic enterprise and Calvinistic spiritual fulfillment. Watt 
significantly connects "improvement" (that is, the cultivation of common land) with labor 
in terms of ownership, illustrating how "the extent of Crusoe's concern with labor, and 
that of the whole ideology of our culture, is certainly unprecedented," as "wherever he 
looks he sees acres that cry out for improvement," engaging "not with noble savagery, 
but purposive possession" ("Robinson Crusoe as Myth" 3 1 9, 3 1 6). However, Watt-as 
well as other analyses- fails to mention the ways in which Crusoe's time marooned on 
the island embodies Locke's notion of property as a biological extension. Enriching 
Watt's observation, biopolitical theorist Roberto Esposito illustrates the ways in which 
"the complex relation between subjectivity and property emerges with Locke's concept 
of property." Guided by the biopolitical analyses of Foucault, Esposito, and Derrida, this 
chapter not only shows how Robinson Crusoe reflects Locke's conceptual link between 
work (as an extension of the autonomous self) and property, but also the ways in which 
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Crusoe's ruminations concerning bloodshed demonstrate the logic of"immunity" (and 
"auto-immunity"), ingrained in the very notion of community. 
Locke reasoned that because "every man has a property in his own person" 
anything one works on becomes her/his property (Locke Sec. 27). 3 Thus, "it is 
labor . . .  that puts the difference of value on everything" (Sec. 40). Crusoe realizes that he 
has been shipwrecked on "what must be part of America" (86), hence his struggle not 
only to survive, but to thrive represents Locke's ideal project of American 
"improvement." According to the OED, to "improve" was to "enclose and cultivate 
wasteland or unoccupied land in order to make it profitable; to undertake or carry out the 
improvement of land or property." Locke dichotomizes European agriculture with the 
unimproved land of the Americas, arguing that, by comparison, land of the same intrinsic 
value is exponentially increased in value when cultivated, "for all. . .  the straw, bran, 
bread, of that acre of wheat . . .  is all the effect of labor" (Sec. 43). Thus, the essence of 
Locke's often-quoted phrase, "In the beginning, all was America" (Sec. 49), 
simultaneously guides Crusoe's quest of "improving" "wasteland"-property that is 
equally available ("common") to all-while clearly representing how his methods of 
improvement represent the evolution of property rights from a centralized influence 
instituted out of necessity, to a self -empowered, biologically-centered act of 
individuality, secured by concentrated labor and validated by contractual ownership. 
3 One can see the connection of property to personhood as early as the 131n century in the phrase, in 
(one's) proper person [after post-classical Latin in propria persona (frequently 1214-1350 in British 
sources); compare Anglo-Norman and Middle French en propre personne (1309 in Old French in plural 
as en propres persones; French en (so) propre personne)]: in one's own person. t proper 
thing n. Obs. One's own thing, a property (OED). However, Locke revolutionized the notion of person hood 
by declaring bodily autonomy in the form of programmed, economic relations contingent on acquisition 
through labor. 
Defoe places Crusoe, one might speculate, into an imaginative situation drawn from the 
pages of Locke's "Two Treatises" to illustrate Crusoe's gradual transformation of 
"wasteland" into property. 
14 
As the embodiment of a Lockean proprietary subject, Crusoe's main methods of 
improvement on the island include domestication protected and sustained by fortification 
and enclosure. Just as property cannot be instituted without means of protection from 
what is common to all, Crusoe must first establish impassable enclosures not only to curb 
his ever-present dread, but also to ensure the safety needed to raise crops and domesticate 
animals. After finding himself on a supposedly deserted island after a shipwreck, Crusoe 
considers his only remedy "a thick bushy Tree like a Fir, but thorny . . .  where [he] resolv'd 
to sit all Night, and consider the next Day what Death [he] should dye" (39). Defoe's 
subtle inclusion of the Fir tree's thorniness highlights Crusoe's concern for defensive 
measures in the unfathomable wild where death seems certain. As Crusoe's thoughts are 
often "wholly employed about securing [himself] against. . .  Savages . . .  and wild Beasts" 
( 4 7), he resolves to live upon a virtually impenetrable "Little plain on the side of a rising 
hill" (48), complete with a cave-like opening that he enlarges to make room to sleep, 
cook, and safely stockpile his massive cache of acquired materials. Crusoe later names 
this initial home his "Castle," aptly named for the tried-and-true method of fortified 
entrenchment he uses for each of his subsequent encampments: Using two rows of stakes 
driven into the earth and layered with cables in a semi-circle (which steadily grows so 
dense as to conceal all traces of human habitation) Crusoe then fashions a ladder rather 
than a door for entry, temporarily relieved that he now is "so completely fenc'd in, and 
fortified, as I thought, from all the World" (52). 
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Of course, Crusoe first had to attain the materials needed for enclosure and 
fortification. Immediately upon awakening on his first morning in his new home, he 
discovers the tide has driven the wrecked ship to an accessible point, and after several 
trips, not only does he secure enough supplies to ensure his survival, but also everything 
needed to establish a temporarily comfortable existence contingent upon experimental 
labor (trial and error) guided by explicit goals, explaining that "by squaring everything by 
reason . . .  every man may be in time Master of every mechanic Art" (55). Crusoe's success 
on the island is due to the capital that becomes his property through labor. He uses an 
iron crow (a jack) to break free and transport products as diverse as lumber, canvas from 
sails, cables, kegs of gunpowder, etc. The contents of the ship, as well as the components 
of the ship itself (i.e., lumber, canvas, and cables) are the property of others until Crusoe 
appropriates them, later using his fortunate finds for sheltered tents made primarily of 
canvas and enclosures fashioned from strategically arranged stakes and rigging. 
Upon discovering money on the ship, Crusoe notes the futility of currency in his 
isolated situation, yet still decides to take the monies. Most atypically, Defoe rhetorically 
uses theatrical language to express Crusoe's ambivalence, with logic reminiscent of 
Locke's viewpoint on currency: 
0 Drug! . . .  Thou art not worth to me . . .  what art though good for? . . .  One of 
those Knives is worth all this Heap; I have no manner of use for thee, e'en 
remain where thou art, and go to the Bottom as a Creature whose Life is 
not worth saving. However, upon second thoughts I took it away . . .  (47) 
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Crusoe cannot resist the urge to take that which could easily guarantee his passage, or 
substantially enlarge his capital, back to what he deems advanced civilization. Praising 
the advent of currency in relation to increasing one's property, Locke notes the following: 
Find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his 
neighbors, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his 
possessions. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man 
in proportion to food, raiment and carriage, has its value only from the 
consent ofmen . . .  [although it may] be hoarded up without injury to any 
one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. 
(my emphasis Sec. 49-50)4 
Because money or anything "that hath the use and value of money" is useless without 
means of trade, Crusoe can only hoard his treasure after transporting it (with some 
difficulty) to shore. 
While it is not money, but "infinite labor" (Robinson Crusoe 120) that allows 
Crusoe to both attain all the things needed to survive-with modest amenities such as a 
chair, table, ink for writing, bowls, wicker baskets, and the occasional draught of rum-
he later transports his unspoiled treasure back to England, presenting a large portion to 
trusted friends (the Widow and the Ship Captain), both of whom, although presuming 
4 Esposito discusses the ways in which the arrival of currency disrupts Locke's proprietary logic. Locke 
praised the development of currency, noting how it allowed one to "enlarge his [or her) possessions" (Sec. 
SO) due to the stimulating effects of trade, prompted by the enclosure of land and guided by private 
ownership. Esposito argues that as the replacement of goods with currency left much less in common for 
others, property became distanced from the body, taking on a "purely juridical stamp," embedding one's 
subjectivity within the thing possessed, while that which is possessed takes on the figuratively juridical 
identity of the "owner" (68). In other words, because one can juridically achieve any form of property via 
capital, one's self and proprietary relationships are forged in the law, thus politicizing the populace. 
17 
him dead, serendipitously saw to his financial affairs. Despite his efforts to achieve 
autonomy and financial success through carefully conceived labor, Crusoe's economic 
triumph hinged entirely upon the goodness of others who selflessly aid his cause, 
mirroring Locke's logic in terms of counting upon the altruism of others regarding equal 
apportionment and overall fair business dealings ("On Property," Sec. 5 1  ). Thus, 
Crusoe's commercial success contradicts the notion of the invisible hand of capitalism; 
circumstances demanded that he place undivided attention upon his own survival 
(sustained through biopolitical "improvement" of the land), while others selflessly 
maintained his fortune. 
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault describes the invisible hand as the principle 
of governing less by letting things take their natural course in business dealings-that is, 
only when avoiding altruism by worrying only about one's own business does capital 
collectively flourish (279). In the words of Adam Smith, "I have never known much good 
done by those who affected to trade for the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed, not 
very common among merchants" (The Wealth of Nations IV.2). Regarding Smith's 
notion of the invisible hand, Foucault maintains, "He is speaking of those people who, 
without really knowing why or how, pursue their own interest and this ends up benefiting 
everyone. Each only thinks of his own gain and, in the end, the whole of industry 
benefits . . .  [.] The collective good must not be an objective . . .  because it cannot be 
calculated, at least, not within an economic strategy" (279). Defoe's notion of Providence 
is ultimately a one-sided form of Smith's conception of the invisible hand. Watt goes so 
far as to suggest that Crusoe does not seem to enjoy labor at all, and that, "What [Crusoe] 
[truly] wanted (and later obtained) were unearned increments from the labor of 
others . . .  regard[ing] his little profits on the island as only a consolation prize" (323). 
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As he explores the island, Crusoe finds temporary relief from his fears as he 
stumbles upon a place that heavily contrasts with his favored "Castle'' on the hill. 
Although, like the sunken treasure, he considers it "a Right of Possession," Crusoe's tone 
shifts radically when describing this Edenic vale: 
[T]he country appeared so fresh, so green, so flourishing, everything being 
in a constant Verdure, or flourish of Spring, that it looked like a planted 
garden (original emphasis). I descended a little on the Side of that 
delicious Vale, surveying it with a secret Kind of Pleasure (though mixed 
with my other afflicting thoughts) to think that this was all my own, that I 
was King and Lord of all this country indefeasibly, and had a Right of 
Possession; and if I could convey it, I might have it in Inheritance, as 
completely as any Lord of a Manor in England. (my emphasis 80) 
The words "fresh," "delicious," "green," "flourish," "verdure," and "pleasure" invoke all 
that is untainted on the island, all of which makes the self-proclaimed Sovereign (with a 
"Right of Possession") "so enamored of this place" that he decided to remain for a time, 
and, just as before, "construct a kind of Bower, and surround it at a distance with a strong 
fence, being a double hedge, as high as [he] could reach, well stak'd, and filled in 
between with brushwood" (8 1 ). But unlike his first dwelling, Crusoe realizes "to enclose 
[himself here in the vale,] among the Hills and Woods, in the Center of the Island, was to 
anticipate [his] bondage . . .  " (8 1) .  Crusoe significantly names the structure he builds in his 
new paradise his "Bower," later dubbing the surrounding area his "County Seat," where 
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he later keeps and tends to goats. Bowers signify "a pleasant shady place under trees or 
climbing plants in a garden or wood," as well as to "shade or enclose (a place or 
person)." Crusoe's aptly named Bower and Castle (the latter term seemingly conflicting 
with the pleasant imagt: of a Bower) coru10te staunch fortification of one's property in the 
face of threat, while also, in Crusoe's case, encouraging autonomous domestic cultivation 
driven by profitable self-governance. The significance of preserving one's property (as a 
biological extension of one's self) cannot be missed. 
For the first time since his arrival on what he considers a "prison" (77), Crusoe 
"began to enjoy [himself]" (8 1 ), relishing in the simple joys of harvesting grapes, raisins, 
lemons, and limes. Crusoe's act of appropriating that which requires no tools, such as 
lemons, grapes, and limes, harkens back to Locke's proclamation that because "[h]e that 
is nourished by the acorns he picked under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the 
trees in the wood, has certainly taken them to himself. . .  labor put a distinction between 
them and common, and so they became his private right" (Sec. 28). Crusoe considers his 
self-conceived "right of possession"-later extended beyond the unclaimed goods of 
nature to an indigenous servant and captive/stranded Spaniards-worthy of "inheriting" 
money just as a Lord (that is, a landowner or owner of any property measured by 
purchasing power) of a Manor in England (80). 
After realizing that his stock of gunpowder is rapidly diminishing after years of 
hunting game, Crusoe encloses land for taming wild goats. First using food to gain their 
trust (those he inadvertently starves), he then "enclose[s] five several Pieces of Ground to 
feed them in, with little Pens to drive them into, to take them as [he] wanted, and Gates 
out of one Piece of Ground to another" ( 116), after realizing that he "must keep Lhe tame 
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from the wild" (1 15). Having no previous experience with manual labor-what Defoe 
calls "mechanic art" (55)-Crusoe muses that he first sought to make the enclosure miles 
longer than feasible for both building the wall and tending to his flock, and that "those 
who understand such enclosures will think I had very little Contrivance," and would 
"smile at my forecast" ( 1 15). After careful consideration, working with "courage" and 
"prudence," Crusoe goes to "an inconceivable deal of Pains to fence and enclose this 
ground," for fear of their escape, and "with infinite labor . . . stuck the outside of the hedge 
so full of small stakes . . .  that it was rather a Pale than a Hedge [and] indeed stronger than 
any Wall" (my emphasis 120). Heavily influenced by Locke's proprietary postulations, 
Defoe illustrates the advantages of domesticating both land and animals by detailing the 
added comforts Crusoe gains for his troubles, as the latter "not only had goat's flesh to 
feed on when [he] pleased," but is now able to pump his own milk, of which he indulges 
up to two gallons a day, from which he makes cheese and butter-"an agreeable 
Surprize" ( 1 1 6). 
In the spirit of Locke's ideological vision of American improvement, Crusoe not 
only appropriates the fruits of nature, but also the land needed to properly enclose and 
increase his stock as needed, although Locke argued that even 
ten thousand or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready 
cultivated and well stocked, too, with cattle, in the middle of the inland 
parts of America, where [there are] no hopes of commerce with other parts 
of the world, to draw money . . .  by the sale of the product. . . would not be 
worth the enclosing, and we should see [one such as Crusoe] give up again 
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to the wild common of Nature whatever was more than would supply the 
conveniences of life, to be had there for him and his family. (Sec. 48) 
Defoe sidestepped a problematic depiction of outright "gentrification" by creating an 
uninhabited island for Crusoe to claim. Because the island has no inhabitants, Defoe 
seems to say, Crusoe is merely accessing land that is ultimately common, especially 
considering the great lengths he took in terms of calculated labor. Before Crusoe departs 
from the island, he teaches the marooned Spaniards, just as he taught Friday, all he has 
learned from increasing the production value of "wasteland"; when the island is finally 
inhabited, and fueled by trade, it is as if every "subject" has their very own copy of the 
Lockean manifesto of property that is Robinson Crusoe to guide their cause of starting 
fresh in the Americas. However, when viewed through the eyes of Indigenous Peoples of 
America-whom Locke referred to as "rich in land and poor in all the comforts of life . . .  
for want of improving it by labour" (Sec. 4 1 )-Crusoe's project reflects the Eurocentric 
origins of property rights, guaranteed by Divine Agency and protected by one's immunity 
from that which is "common" in terms of appropriating inhabited, uncultivated land in 
the name of commercial "improvement. "5 
5 Thomas Jefferson notably changed Locke's "property" to "the pursuit of happiness," thus conflating life 
and liberty with property, that which is necessary to achieve happiness, or, in other words, a "politically 
qualified" life as a recognized citizen. It is no conjecture to say Locke's conception of property has been 
instrumental in forging American individualism, the notion of inalienable rights, and promoting Manifest 
Destiny by "prosthetically" extending "civilization" into space through advanced technologies. 
Chapter Two: Crusoe's Originary (Auto)immunitary Logic 
"And the terror of the autoimmune itself must risk its closure within the comfort 
of a possible narrative of mastery "-Alice Andrews 
Immunity 
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In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which Crusoe's tactic of excessive 
fortification and enclosure illustrate Esposito's notion of (auto)immunity as it relates to 
the former's quest of "improvement." In his research, Esposito focuses on the notion of 
"immunity," which he views as the fundamental concept of biopolitical governance. 
While medical immunity denotes the body's defense system against harmful antigens and 
pathogens, juridical immunity entails legal protection from the law, such as diplomatic 
immunity, absolute immunity, or qualified immunity. Interestingly, the clinical notion of 
immunity was borrowed from legal terminology and was only later applied to the field of 
medicine: "immunity" is from the Latin immiinitas, meaning exemption from taxes or 
public duties. For example, "a Roman magistrate owed munus [connoting a service, favor 
gift, burden, duty, obligation, spectacle, public show] in the form of periodic games and 
feasts to those he governed" (J. Hillis Miller 221). 
And as these obligatory rituals owed to the community are rooted in sacrificial 
logic (illustrated by Rene Girard's research in Violence and the Sacred ( 1972), to which I 
will return later), the notion of community has within its logic humanity's originary 
compulsion to purge its self-destructive, retaliatory nature (that remains "the hidden 
center of the familiar") by some means of mythologically veiled, ritualistic sacrifice. As 
W. J. T. Mitchell points out, "The whole theory of the immune system and the discipline 
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of immunology is riddled with images drawn from the sociopolitical sphere--of invaders 
and defenders, hosts and parasites, natives and aliens, and of borders and identities that 
must be maintained" (282). Esposito reasons that Locke's theoretical split between "one's 
own" and that which is "common" disrupls sovereign rule, which indisputably placed the 
collective power of a community into a Sovereign, an extension of the people, who must 
be obeyed for order to prevail. Locke's property rights undermine sovereignty by fusing 
the biological (owning one's own body and the rights thereto) with the political act of 
claiming property for one's self, justified by the presupposition that because one owns 
one's body, property is an extension of work, as work is a biological extension of the self. 
To reiterate, juridical immunity is usually tied to the concept of protection by law 
from the law itself. Esposito, on the other hand, notes (through his analysis of Hobbes 
and Locke), the ways in which Lockean proprietary logic i llustrates the precondition of 
juridical immunity-that is, how Locke's biological conception of property exemplifies 
the ideological transition from a community's need for protection from continued 
struggle in a Hobbesian state of nature, to subjects' realization of the necessity to 
individually immunize (that is, to protect and empower) themselves from a centralized 
power of governance via Locke's biopolitical theorization of property rights. Esposito 
identifies in Lockean property rights the immunitary logic through which bodily 
autonomy unites property and work, thus paradoxically securing one's individualized 
identity/property from what is common to all, while simultaneously compromising one's 
subjectivity. 
Esposito establishes the influence of Locke's theory of property by juxtaposing it 
with Hobbes' notion of sovereign rule in Leviathan ( 1651 ). While Hobbes noted that 
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collective society willfully instituted a sovereign power out of an instinctive need for 
preservation, the existence of property and subjective life, according to Esposito's 
analysis of Locke, are interdependent. Esposito reasons that, for Hobbes, "immunization" 
signifies humanity's inherent need for obedience to a supreme power (a Sovereign) in the 
name of collective preservation. The negative characteristic of immunization (the conflict 
between collective- and self-preservation) signifies the process by which subjects 
willfully appoint a sovereign power, out of necessity, that transcends their control .  
Sovereignty, in this sense, precedes the subject insofar as communities must fust institute 
ways of immunizing the populace from both internal and external threats. 
Esposito, on the other hand, notes the ways in which, according to Locke's 
premise, property precedes sovereignty and social organization because of its 
inseparability from the biological body in the form of acquired labor: as Esposito says of 
the relationship between life and property, being and having, person and thing: "the one 
becomes the content and container of the other" (Bios 64). Lockean property rights 
ironically constitute subjectivity itself; just as the property of an owner can only be 
identified as such by classifying it as an extension of the possessor's body, theoretically, 
the owner's identity is biologically contingent upon that which he or she appropriates out 
of necessity and desire (67). 
Esposito's work on immunity highlights the proprietary logic underlying Crusoe's 
designation of "one's own" in relation to what is "common." Dialectically approaching 
the relationship between immunity and community, Esposito reasons that each term is 
reciprocally inscribed in the other in the same way Locke's concept of life and property 
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results in "the one becoming the content and container of the other" (64).6 The notion of 
community indicates the "public in opposition to 'private' or 'general' (but also 
'collective') in contrast to particular" (Communilas 3). Crusoe's obsession with 
concealment and tedious toiling are grounded in his ultimate state of ambivalence 
regarding an isolated yet omnipotent existence as opposed to a life of social connectivity. 
Crusoe both desires and dreads the thought of human contact, evident after he discovers 
the mysterious footprint: 
How strange a Chequer-Work of Providence is the Life of Man . . .  that to 
have seen one of my own Species, would have seem'd to me . . .  the greatest 
Blessing that Heaven itself, next to the supreme Blessing of Salvation, 
could bestow . . .  that I should now tremble at the very Apprehensions of 
seeing a Man, and was ready to sink into the Ground at but the Shadow or 
silent Appearance of a Man's having set his Foot in the Island. (123) 
Crusoe cowers in fear at the first sign of unknown threats, yet empowers himself by 
improving his lot through rigorous labor vindicated by appropriative logic, both in terms 
of land and castaways on (and Carib visitors to) the island. In fact, Crusoe's mentality 
merges Hobbesian and Lockean thought as he ponders the wisest ways both to ensure 
political stability through a centralized form of consensual authority and an 
individualized method of proprietary ownership contingent upon improved goods, 
6 Esposito explicates the etymological basis of "community," the Latin munus, which has three meanings: 
onus, officium, and donum. Onus and officium refer to obligation and office, while donum paradoxically 
refers to "a category of gift that requires, even demands, an exchange in return" (Bios introduction 
Campbell). In Communitos Esposito notes that "Once one has accepted the munus, one is obliged to 
return the onus, in the form of either goods or services [officium]. The "original munus that constitutes us 
and makes us destitute in our moral finiteness" (8) refers to the endless cycle of one's civic responsibility 
to "give" in society that shadows individuality with an obligatory sense of unreciprocated duty. 
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respectively. Only after considering the heinous offence of cannibalism, before the island 
was under his control, does Crusoe's "immunitary" fear transform into a murderous, 
"autoimmunitary" impulse, eventually checked by reason. 
On several occasions, Crusoe somewhat ironically proclaims himself Sovereign 
ruler of his eventually "peopled" island, yet he simultaneously considers himself a 
prisoner of his domain: "tho' I was indeed at large in the Place, yet the Island was 
certainly a Prison to me, and that in the worst Sense in the World" (77); "It was the sixth 
of November, in the sixth year of my Reign, or my Captivity, which you please . . .  " (1 08); 
"How can he sweeten the bitterest Providences, and give us Cause to praise him for 
Dungeons and Prisons . . .  there was my Majesty the Prince and Lord of the whole 
island . . .  I could hang, draw, give Liberty, and take it away, and no Rebels among all my 
subjects" ( 1 16); and finally, Crusoe's isolated desolation gives way to mastery over 
himself and others once he establishes the right to rule as King, not Prince, via honored 
contractual agreements: "My island was now peopled, and I thought myself very rich in 
Subjects; and it was a merry Reflection which I frequently made, How like a King I 
look'd" (1 88). 
In the vein of Locke's vision of religious tolerance, the Sovereign Crusoe "allows 
Liberty of Conscious throughout [his] Dominions" ( 1 88), granting freedom of religion 
and immunity for Friday, "a Protestant," his Father . . .  , a Pagan and a Cannibal, and the 
[marooned] Spaniard . . . [,] a Papist" ( 1 88). However, this immunity is contingent on his 
subjects being "perfectly subjected[,]" ready to kill or be killed "if there had been 
Occasion of it . . . " (original emphasis 1 88). Viewing Crusoe's dominion through the lens 
of Esposito's immunitary paradigm, the subject's, 
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protection is the negation of life, in the sense that such a protection, when 
pushed beyond a certain limit, forces life into a sort of prison or armoring 
in which what we lose is not only freedom, but also the real sense of 
individual and collective existence . . .  [.] [W]hat safeguards the individual 
and political body is also what impedes its development, and beyond a 
certain point risks destroying it." (Esposito "Interview with Timothy 
Campbell") 
In this sense, Crusoe is the "imprisoned" subject, constantly fortifying his territory, 
optimizing his labor, and dreading death at all turns, and expressing this self-destructive 
logic only after discovering he may no longer be the only human being (in complete 
control) on the island. 
Autoimmunity 
Crusoe one day happens upon a solitary human footprint, or as J.M. Coetzee 
articulates it-"a print, therefore . . .  a sign of a foot of a man [,]" which also, more 
significantly signified the following maddening realization: "You are not alone . . .  [.] No 
matter how far you sail, no matter where you hide, you will be searched out" ("He and 
His Man"). Driven by dread at the thought of unknown trespassers into his isolated 
existence, Crusoe combines his pride in cultivation with his immunitarian fear of the 
"other," as he considers "throw[ing] down my Enclosures . . .  [,] turning all my tame 
Cattle into the woods . . .  [,] Digging up my two Com Fields; then to demolish my Bower, 
and Tent," to leave no trace for the mysterious visitor(s) to discover, fearing they would 
"still be prompted to look farther in order to find out the Persons inhabiting" (my 
emphasis 125). Crusoe's self-destructive logic represents the ways in which immunity 
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can become autoimmunity (which, like immunity, conceptually relates to the clinical 
notion of the term), as it refers to peoples' or collective society's paradoxical destruction 
of their/its own defensive measures, and eventually themselves/itself. Even if Crusoe 
survived after destroying his means of subsistence and confronting the mysterious 
visitor(s), he would be once again obliged to use his remaining supplies to rebuild his 
utopian community of one. 7 
Defoe's depiction of Crusoe's self-destructive impulse illustrates Derrida's 
theoretical observations of autoimmunity, on which he dedicated much of his time in his 
later works; one can see how Crusoe's obsessive project of fortification and concealment, 
in short, his autoimmunitary fear of certain death, reveals Derrida's logic "of a threat that 
is still worse and still to come" (Rogues 104). Similarly, to Esposito's use of the term, 
Derrida uses the metaphorical notion of medical autoimmunity (the body's attack on its 
own defense mechanisms in the attempt to target a disease) "to define an absolutely 
universal condition of any political order or community" (J. Hillis Miller 221): 
[N]o community is possible that would not cultivate its own auto-
immunity, a principle of sacrificial self-destruction ruining the principle of 
self-protection . . .  and this in some sort of invisible and spectral sur-vival. 
This self-contesting attestation keeps the auto-immune community alive, 
7 Defoe depicts Crusoe's ideal form of governing what he considered suitable subjects, in the form of 
animals, long before the landing of the Caribs or Spaniards: Pol, his parrot, an unnamed dog, several cats, 
and goats: "Then to see how like a King I din'd too all alone, attended by my servants; Poll, as if he had 
been my Favorite, was the only Person permitted to Talk to me ... My dog sat always at my Right Hand, and 
two cats, one on Side of the Table, and one on the other, expecting now and then a Bit from my Hand, as 
a Mark of Special Favour" (117 my emphasis). The way in which Defoe describes Crusoe's fully compliant 
animal "servants," whether it is intended as irony or not, bares a disturbing similarity to Friday's self­
subjugated pledge to Crusoe. 
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which is to say, open to something other and more than itself: the other, 
the future, death, freedom, the coming or love of the other . . .  (Derrida 
"Faith and Knowledge" 82 my emphasis) 
A deconstructive reading of the logic of language structures reveals the paradoxical 
notion of inclusive inclusion that comprises the foundation of a community's inherent 
self-destructive (autoimmunitary) instinct-ironically contingent on "some sort of 
invisible and spectral [compulsion for] sur-vival."8 The prefix, "sur" (above or beyond) 
combined with the Latin infinitive vivere, (to live) literally translates, "to live beyond." 
Hence, a community's "self-contesting attestation" (the self-contradictory logic on which 
societies function) operates based on a principle of "living beyond" itself.-that is, the 
current state of things-opening a space from which to continue striving to reach the 
"classic emancipatory ideal": the basis of a model civilization.9 
Crusoe's "auto-immunitary" reaction to possible danger reflects Esposito's 
critique of Locke, as Crusoe associates his newly individualistic sovereign identity with 
property in terms of excessive means of self-preservation. Crusoe is, in a sense, a 
prototypical democratic representation of the precarious balance of sovereignty and 
governmentality, as he must dictate how best to delegate responsibility (to himself, then 
his "subjects," first animal, then human) in a state of continual dread by projecting 
8 Agamben crystallizes this contradictory logic by illustrating the similar, paradoxically conceptual 
structure of language and sovereignty, both of which operate based on the logic of inclusive exclusion in a 
"state of exception." See Homo Sacer {19-21). 
9 Miller expands on Derrida's faith in the "classical emancipatory ideal": the Enlightenment ideals that led 
to (America's] Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights, that is, the ideal of an egalitarian 
democracy that would be government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (215). 
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strength, establishing verbal contracts, and allowing his island inhabitants free reign in 
his absence after imparting onto them all he has learned of commercial "improvement." 
Derrida's analysis of the "worst to come," the foundation of sovereignty and law, as well 
as his reading trauma through the lens of the "death drive," highlights the inherent dread 
that dictates Crusoe's indecisive thought process (as both sovereign and "masterless" 
subject) and eventually motivates his self-justified reaction to perceived threats, including 
his interpretation of Providence. 
In Rogues, Derrida argues that distinguishable sovereign powers (such as the US 
and Russia during the Cold War periods) once "held in check by a reasoned game theory 
that calculated the risks of escalation so as to exclude, in principle and according to the 
greatest probability, any suicidal operation[,]" have been truncated by globalization 
(mondialisation) and forced to rely on "rogue" measures-that is, transcending the law in 
order to quell what are perceived as global, especially terroristic, threats. Crusoe's initial 
irresolution regarding the Caribs This want of sovereign power-"sovereignty in general 
but, more visibly, more decipherably, indivisible nation-state sovereignty" ( 1 42)­
exacerbates the inherent autoimmunitary nature of centralized powers. What "loses its 
pertinence" in the process, Derrida continues, 
is the concept of war, and thus of world war, of enemy and even of 
terrorism, along with the distinction between civilian and military or 
between army, police, and militia. What is called just as obscurely 
"September 1 1 " will have neither created nor revealed this new situation, 
although it will have surely media-theatricalized it. (154) 
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The politically charged labels of "terrorist" and "rogue state" have further blurred the line 
between ally and foe, extending the punitive powers of the State, exercised domestically 
and abroad, under the guise of"patriotic" unity. Ironically, the democratic nature of the 
US made it possible for the Saudi (Saudi Arabia is notably an economic ally of the US) 
hijackers to acquire the skills and funding they needed to carry out a full-fledged attack 
on American soil. After all, as Derrida emphasizes, they "trained on the sovereign soil of 
the United States, under the nose of the CIA and the FBI, perhaps not without some 
autoimmune consent on the part of an administration with at once more and less foresight 
than one tends to think when it is faced with what is claimed to be a major, unforeseeable 
event" ( 40). 
The exception of the event of 9/1 1, argues Derrida, lies in the terror of"the worst 
to come"-"a nuclear attack that threatens to destroy the state apparatus of the United 
States, that democratic state whose hegemony is as obvious as it is precarious, in crisis, a 
state assumed to be the guarantor, the sole and ultimate guardian, of world order for all 
legitimate, sovereign states" ( 1 05). The trauma of such a monumentalizing event, 
consist[s] not, as is too often believed of trauma in general, in an effect, in 
a wound produced by what had effectively already happened, what had 
just actually happened, and risked being repeated one more time, but in the 
undeniable fear or apprehension of a threat that is worse and still to 
come. The trauma remains traumatizing and incurable because it comes 
from the future. For the virtual can also traumatize. (my emphasis Rogues 
104) 
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Expanding Freud's notion of the "death drive" (to explore what is "beyond the pleasure 
principle") through an autoimmunitary lens, Derrida proposes that "trauma takes place 
when one is wounded by a wound that has not yet taken place, in an effective fashion, in 
a way other than by the sign of its announcement" (1 04-05). 
Derrida favors Freud's translation of mimesis as "repetition" rather than the 
Aristotelian notion of "imitation," thereby linking his notion of "iterability" with 
the drive to suffer (by repeatedly beholding/experiencing the traumatic event), instead of 
the unconscious repression of an event that has already plagued the mind, as Freud 
proposed (Krell 24-25). The continually looped, visual representation of the trauma that 
brought the world's paradigm of democratic ideals to its knees (that is, the planes 
colliding with the Twin Towers: what Derrida calls the "media-theatricalization" of the 
event), combined with the typically xenophobic castigation of anything considered socio­
ethno-culturally other, in this case, un-American-"If you 're not with us, you 're against 
us"-inflicted the American populace with the contagious dread of still-worse future 
calamities committed by anyone not ideologically aligned to Western (and typically, not 
unironically, "Christianized") ideals of democracy. 
Further shedding light on Crusoe's autoimmunitary logic, Derrida shows, through 
an analysis of Hobbes' Leviathan, the ways in which the reciprocal relationship of fear, 
terror, obedience, and obligation between subject and sovereign is the foundation of 
sovereignty and the Jaw. Derrida proposes that fear is the correlate to terror, 
fear as it is defined by the Leviathan [which is] the animal-machine 
designed to cause fear or of a prosthetic and state organon, a state as 
prosthesis, the organ of a state prosthesis . . .  which runs on fear and reigns 
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by fear. The correlate on the side of the passions, the central affect of the 
law, is fear. And as there is no law without sovereignty, we shall have to 
say that sovereignty calls for, presupposes, provokes fear, as its condition 
of possibility but also as its main effect. Sovereignty causes fear, and fear 
makes the sovereign. (The Beast and the Sovereign Vol I. 40) 
Hence, Derrida1s reading of Hobbes validates Esposito's immunitary analysis by 
accentuating the ways in which the exceedingly intensified defensive measures of 
societies are contingent on the fear "which exceeds corporeal presence . . .  [,] making it the 
passion correlative to law . . .  [,] both the origin of the law and of the transgression of the 
law, the origin of both law and crime" (41). Crusoe's precarious sovereignty provokes his 
fear of a future threat. Traces of his autoimmunitary logic, as I continue to show, reflect 
Derrida's theory of trauma-the inevitable terror of a worse situation "to come" 
continually plagues his island existence. One can see the ways in which Crusoe's 
incessant dread of human contact prompts his excessive means of fortification, forever 
torturing his mind with thoughts of inevitable death. Crusoe will use any means necessary 
to justify conquering his fear, which for him signifies deliverance from his imprisoned 
mode of sovereignty, wherein he both creates and vehemently justifies his "lawful" duty 
to protect himself by any means necessary, to the extent of intricately planning the 
destruction of his defensive measures, signaling his own demise. 
After discovering that Caribs (native to a nearby island) visit his newly claimed 
home to sacrificially cannibalize enemy combatants (a discovery significantly taking 
place near his paradisiacal "Bower"), Crusoe "[ e ]xpects [he] should One day fall into the 
hands of those Merciless creatures" ( 138) and is reduced to a panic-stricken state of 
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anxiety for two full years, though he later realizes they sporadically (and briefly) visit the 
island only to sacrifice enemy combatants. Crusoe details the lengths to which the fear of 
the unknown "enemy" drive him: 
I believe the Reader of this will not think Strange, if I confess that these 
Anxieties, these constant Dangers I liv'd in, and the Concern that was now 
upon me, put an End to all Invention, and to all the Contrivances that I had 
laid for my future Accommodations and Conveniences. I had the care of 
my Safety more now than upon my hands, than that of Food. I car'd not to 
drive a Nail, or chop a Stick of Wood now, for fear the Noise I make 
should be heard. ( 1 38) 
Crusoe also abstains from lighting open fires and firing his guns, retreating to his 
"Apartment in the woods," where he finds "to his unspeakable Consolation," a deep 
recess in a naturally hollowed-out cave where he burrows deeply (later storing 
munitions), yearning for "nothing so much as a safe Retreat" ( 1 38). Crusoe reasonably 
concludes that men take "ridiculous resolution[s]. . .  when possessed by fear," which "is 
ten thousand times more terrifying than Danger it self, when apparent to the Eyes" (126). 
Although he finds himself spending "most of my Hours, which should have been 
better employed . . .  in a Murthering humour" (planning how best to attack his adversaries), 
Crusoe seems to pinpoint what Esposito termed the "immunitary crisis" that would 
inevitably follow, "if I kill'd one Party, suppose Ten, or a Dozen, I was still the next Day, 
or Week, or Month, to kill another . . . ad infinitum, till I should be at length no less a 
Murtherer than they were in being Man-eaters; and perhaps much more so" ( 144). 
Despite Crusoe's revelation, at times he thinks he has no choice but to systematically 
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slaughter all the "cannibals" he can with the help of his newfound "subject," Friday, as 
"sacrificial violence is the hidden foundation on which society is founded," according to 
Rene Girard. 10 Expanding upon this notion, Roberto Esposito observes, 
All of the stories that tell of the founding crime, the collective crime, the 
ritual assassination, the sacrificial victim featured in the history of 
civilization don't do anything else except evoke metaphorically the 
delinquere [crime] that keeps us together, in the technical sense of 'to 
lack' and 'to be wanting'; the breach, the trauma, the lacuna out of which 
we originate. Not the origin but its absence, its withdrawal. It is the 
original munus that constitutes us and makes us destitute in our moral 
finiteness. (8) 
Highlighting the sacrificial violence inherent in Locke's logic of property rights, Esposito 
notes how the asymmetrical relationship of the individual's biological acquisition of 
property "causes a progressive decrease in the goods that are at the disposition of others," 
resulting in "internecine conflict." The act of removing this inevitable struggle from 
within the proprietary universe-that is, from within the confines of the community into 
"the formless space of non-property" (Bias 68)-is essential to exorcize the seeds of, in 
Girardi an terminology, "mimetic contagion" that could result in a "sacrificial crisis." 
Defoe exaggeratedly "others" the natives by relying on popular travel narratives of the 
1° For Girard, all desire is mimetic, and the "hidden center of the familiar," the origins of which can be 
seen in sacrificial rites throughout history, is mimetic violence: "all the dissensions, rivalries, jealousies, 
and quarrels within the community that the sacrificial rights are designed to repress" (8). Interestingly, 
Freud translated mimesis as "repetition" rather than "imitation," shedding light on Derrida's notion of 
"iterability." 
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day that marked Caribs as cannibals, vividly marking the grotesqueness of their acts with 
a disturbing depiction of the macabre remains of their sacrificial victims. 
The frightening scene of death rekindles Crusoe's violent impulse, illustrating the 
sacrificial logic at the heart of his appropriative biopolitical project of "improvement" as 
undisputed "Governor" of his land: "The Blood, the Bones, and part of the Flesh of 
humane Bodies . . .  so filled [him] with Indignation . . .  that I began now to premeditate the 
Destruction of the next that I saw there, let them be who or how many soever" (143). 
Esposito, genealogically tracing the juridico-political foundation of personhood forged in 
Ancient Rome, notes "What is most distant from us-this is equally true on the temporal 
register-is the hidden center of the familiar, such that the archaic is so often profoundly 
connected to the contemporary world that it constitutes its most conspicuous feature" 
("The Dispositif of the Person" 27). Crusoe's (and by extension, the colonizing forces of 
Europe) sacrificial logic is the "hidden center of the familiar" that marks immunity's 
excess-that is, the need to separate (both ideologically and biologically) the "race(s)"1 1  
(in the Foucauldian sense), which must be eradicated for the sake of purifying the 
nationalized populace or life itself, respectively. Hobbes, Foucault, Esposito, Derrida, 
Agamben, and Girard all explore the iterably elusive "connection between community 
11 Foucault's analysis of racial conflict in Society Must Be Defended is based upon humanity's warlike 
instinct that he proposed evolved into "State racism," which involves separating (or scapegoating, if you 
will) those ultimately deemed biologically inferior and contagious to the body politic, and later, by 
extension, to the supposed "master race" itself, as evident in Esposito and Agamben's analyses of the Nazi 
thanatopolicial regime, wherein not only those deemed ethnically inferior were "cleansed," but whoever, 
including "ethnically pure" Germans, plagued life itself with what were deemed contagious maladies of 
any kind. 
and violence that is seen [not only] as essential and necessary, [but also] dependent on 
fear and the law of the sovereign exception" (Terms of the Political 123). 
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Girard considers the modern judicial process a systematized form of retribution 
that serves to stifle the outbreak of murderous revenge within and without a society. 
Before the advent of judiciary systems, Girard notes, "If men wish to prevent an 
interminable outbreak of vengeance (just as today we wish to prevent nuclear war), it is 
not enough to convince their fellows that violence is detestable-for it is precisely 
because they detest violence that men make a duty of vengeance" ( 1 5). In other words, 
vengeance threatened to eliminate entire societies if reciprocal violence was not 
exorcised through the sacrifice of a scapegoat victim(s), either within or outside of the 
community-the pharmakos/oi of ancient Greek religion. Crusoe's thoughts validate 
Girard's notion of detesting, while ironically justifying, perpetually reciprocated 
slaughter in the name of vengeance, as Crusoe considers the blood he will inevitably have 
to shed-the price of "acquiring" a "Savage": 
I had greatly scrupled the Lawfulness of it to me; and my Heart trembled 
at the thoughts of shedding so much Blood, tho' it was for my 
Deliverance . . .  those Men were Enemies to my Life, and would devour me, 
if they could; that it was Self-preservation in the highest degree, to Deliver 
my self from this Death of a Life, and was acting in my own Defence, as 
much as if they were actually assaulting me, and the like. (my emphasis 
1 56) 
Crusoe's urge to fall victim to a "sacrificial/immunitary crisis" to escape what he 
considers "this Death of a Life" on the island underscores his confusion of his own 
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position as sovereign or prisoner, master or slave. To attain sovereignty, Crusoe must first 
conquer his fear not only of the "other," who could reduce him to a slave, or worse, a 
meal, but also the island itself, which has the power to eventually transform him into that 
which so many European explorers dreaded the most-one reduced to a "primitive" state 
after being psychologically stripped of civilization's merits. Crusoe maintains his sanity 
by "reasoned" employment seasoned with heavily laden didacticism. 12 Defoe scripts a 
silver lining (sovereign and subject peacefully and productively subsisting together) to 
the inevi1able violent encounter that occurs due to Crusoe's desire for deliverance-
which would have happened regardless of Friday's assistance, as the former' s escape was 
eventually effected not by Friday, but by mutinied Spaniards. 
Defoe vividly portrays Crusoe's psychological vacillation regarding the latter's 
inevitable encounter with the Caribs. Shortly after considering his initial thoughts of 
condemnation toward the mysterious visitors, Crusoe compares their shadowy sacrificial 
practices to that of Christian conquest, realizing that 
they think it no more a crime to kill a Captive taken in War, than we do to 
kill an Ox; nor to eat humane Flesh than we do to eat Mutton . . .  [.] I was 
certainly in the wrong . . .  [.] [T]hese people were not Murtherers, in the 
Sense that I had before condemn'd them . . .  any more than those Christians 
12 Defoe portrays Crusoe's salvation as the sole work of neither Providence nor his own wisdom. Rather, 
his sanity seems to rely on staying constantly preoccupied with projects and journalistically authoring his 
own life of seclusion (which Defoe is essentially doing, allegorically: more on this in Chapter Ill) by a 
rigorous regimen of sustained management and productivity, guided by the essential principle of 
bookkeeping: judiciously weighing the good against the bad). 
were Murtherers, who often put to Death the Prisoners taken in Battle. 
( 1 34) 
Crusoe accepts that "these people"-notably the only time Defoe/Crusoe refers to the 
Caribs as "people"-are not criminally nor spiritually liable for their sacrificial rites 
though he finds just cause to use them as needed, whatever the cost, to further his ends. 
While Crusoe tempers his temporary bloodlust with careful reasoning, he later 
fully justifies a preemptive encounter that results in bloodshed, as he 
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was not at first so careful to shun the sight of these Savages, and avoid 
being seen by them, as I was now eager to be upon them. Besides, I 
fancied my self able to manage One, nay, Two or Three Savages, ifl  had 
them, so as to make them entirely Slaves to me, to do whatever I should 
direct them, and to prevent their being able at any time to do my any Hurt. 
( 1 56) 
On his Brazilian plantation, Crusoe greedily desired slaves to quickly increase profits 
that, as he later notes to himself, grow simply by the management of his partner, but now 
he justifies killing and enslaving the visiting islanders to free himself from his 
"imprisoned" existence and ensure his self-preservation. It seems odd that here (and 
elsewhere) Crusoe expresses desire for slaves, but once "Friday" is rescued, named, and 
guaranteed to faithfully serve, Crusoe refers to him as his servant, sometimes prefaced 
by, in the customary English fashion, "Man." Friday has seemingly graduated from slave 
to servant only because he agreed to abstain from cannibalism and mimic Crusoe's way 
of life. 
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Although Crusoe initially balances his urge to kill the Caribs with careful 
reasoning, he refrains from doing so only because he considers it unjust to destroy them if 
his presence remains unknown: 
that this would justify the Conduct of the Spaniards in all their Barbarities 
practic'd in America, where they destroyed Millions of these People, who 
however they were Idolaters and Barbarians, and had several bloody and 
barbarous Rites in their Customs, such as sacrificing human bodies to their 
idols, were yet, as to the Spaniards, very innocent People . . .  ( 1 34) 
If the Caribs happened to spot Crusoe at any point in time, we can assume he would once 
again justify swift "retaliatory" action with a diligence driven by the cold logic and 
unfailing tenacity that fuels his domestic endeavors. Crusoe ultimately concludes the 
"only Way to go about an Attempt for an Escape, was, if possible, to get a Savage in my 
possession," and "that it was impossible to affect this, without attacking a whole Caravan 
of them, and killing them all" (1 55). Thus, Crusoe's Lockean revelation about the merits 
of and tolerance due to the mysterious visitors' religiosity, as well as his acknowledgment 
of the millions of innocent victims of Spanish rule, eventually succumbs to his perceived 
duty to wholly eliminate them from his path of freedom. 
Certain of nothing but his imminent demise, Crusoe can only ponder "what Death 
[he] should dye" from his first moment on the island (39). However, after diligently 
dedicating himself to unbending labor in the vein of Locke's biopolitical discourse of 
"improvement," Crusoe moves from a fatalistic position of certain doom to a hyper­
productive master of "improvement." Defoe alludes to the rewards one can reap from 
intensive mental and physical engagement through Crusoe's successful cultivation of the 
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island, and ultimately, his very survival. And with the help of an ample (and incredibly 
convenient) stock of goods acquired from two wrecked ships, Crusoe is also able to craft 
the "creature comforts," such as a table, chair, canoe, and earthenware, that allow him to 
help sustain his plight. However, after a deconstructive analysis of Locke's concept of 
property rights, the spirit of which flows in Crusoe's veins, Locke's proprietary ideology 
is like the heavenly depiction of George Bailey's triumph over the evils of Mr. Potter's 
avarice in It 's a Wonderful Life-both are trite ideals which cloud the exploitative factors 
at the root cause of Mr. Potter's economic conquest and Crusoe's commercialized vision 
of coldly calculated customs for his island (which have since become gradually 
normalized). 
Crusoe's project is only possible through commercialism sponsored by 
exploitative capital, the immunitary logic of which, as shown by Esposito's research, is 
expressed in Locke's concept of property.13 Witnessing the incredible influence of 
Locke's proprietary ideology in what is considered the first English novel, and 
juxtaposing it with the perspectives of colonized peoples on a habited island, reveals the 
dark legacy of the "Enlightenment." As the Western world became more confident in 
"civilized" humanity's ability to forge its own destiny, standards of both individuality 
and a collective, nationalized identity were established based upon norms dictated by 
institutions and enforced by disciplinary techniques (from the ground up, such as 
13 Brian Fawcett notes the ways in which the logic of franchise capitalism spawned the "discovery" of the 
"new world": Queen Isabella did not send Christopher Columbus on a voyage of discovery; she gave him a 
franchise that demanded that he exploit what he discovered for the mercantile gain of the franchise 
owner. In the new world, God would reward wealth, not understanding. [The Americas) [were] exploited 
before [they] [were) ever explored" {58). 
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performance evaluation, and from the top down, such as incarceration) that, as Foucault 
shows, "guarantee . . .  the submission of forces and bodies . . .  [and] constitute . . .  the 
foundation of the formal, juridical liberties . . .  [.] 'The Enlightenment,' which discovered 
the liberties, also invented the disciplim:::;" (Discipline and Punish 222). 
To alleviate his deep-seated fear of confrontation, Crusoe gains self-control 
through domination, spurred by the perceived terror "to come" and vindicated by 
Eurocentric notions of "reasoned" socio-cultural superiority. Crusoe's battle with doubt, 
escalated by fear, is his biggest stumbling block to attaining the right to govern the 
island-a battle he ultimately "wins" through firm industrious regimentation enforced by 
an advantage of arms and sustained by a stealthy existence, though Defoe depicts it more 
as faith sustained by reason. 
Any system of civil society that fails to judiciously weigh divergent perspectives, 
relying solely upon self-righteous rhetoric to further its Manichean point of view, seems 
doomed to succumb to an increase of its own defense mechanisms to the point of 
attacking the conceptual foundation upon which it stands. Esposito's diagnosis of 
society's combative reflex to immunize itself from contagions arising both within 
(domestic) and without (foreign) combined with Derrida's analysis of Western 
democracy's autoimmunitary nature (in terms of fear as the basis of sovereign law), sheds 
light on Defoe's depiction of Crusoe's paradoxically imprisoned mode of sovereignty. 
Those who both make and are immune from the law have the most to fear; dreading the 
usurpation of power, they must quell their dread of revolution through either exclusionary 
domination or obligatory contract, contingent on the sovereign (or State's) protection and 
the subjects' obedience. 
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Chapter III: Which the Author, and Which 'His Man?': The Bio-politics of 'life-
writing' 
"All things are words of some strange tongue, in thrall to Someone, Something, 
who both day and night proceeds in endless gibberish to write the history of the 
world In that dark scrawl Rome is set down, and Carthage, I, you, all, and this 
my being which escapes me quite, my anguished life that's cryptic, recondite, and 
garbled as the tongues of Babel's fall. "-Jorge Luis Borges 
Much has been speculated about the nature of "origin," "history" and "narrative." 
Indeed, stories themselves, especially myths, are a product of our insatiable obsession 
with etiological examinations of life and death, 14 their narratives shifting with our own-
to update Heraclitus' famous aphorism, "No one ever [reads the same story] twice, for it 
is not the same [story] and they are not the same person." In a passage reminiscent of 
Foucault's "What is an Author," Watt rightly states that "It is not an author but a society 
that metamorphoses a story into a myth, by retaining only what its unconscious needs 
dictate and forgetting everything else" ("Robinson Crusoe as Myth" 3 14). Watt was 
speaking of Robinson Crusoe's power to enter the social consciousness in a way 
reminiscent of the epics that paved the way for the birth of the English novel (in the late 
1 7th-early l 81h century), which featured a more particularized look at the psyche of 
characters in relation to a world stripped of singularity through which they must navigate. 
14 In the words of ltalo Calvino, "The ultimate meaning to which all stories refer has two faces: the 
continuity of life, the inevitability of death" (If On a Winter's Night a Traveler? 259). 
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Marina Mackay notes, "Right from 'the start'-what the canonical narrative 
designates as the start-the English novel has created mysteries around parental origins" 
(The Cambridge Introduction to the Novel 29).15 Edward Said, ideological following 
Watt's analysis, traces the novel's (in lhe Western world) concurrent theme of origin with 
the emergence of the bourgeoisie in the late l 71h century, which is why, he continues, "for 
its first century, the novel is all about birth, possible orphanhood, the discovery of roots, 
and the creation of a new world, a career and society. Robinson Crusoe. Tom Jones. 
Tris tram Shandy." (On Late Style 4 ). Said, who was diagnosed with leukemia in 1991, 
shifted his earlier focus on "origin" to "lateness"-"the continuity that occurs after birth, 
the exfoliation from a beginning" (3). Noting "the relationship between bodily condition 
and aesthetic style[,]" Said uses Francois Jacob's phrase, la logique du vivant (the logic 
of the living), subtly revealing the novel's complicity and critique of biopolitics. 
For Said, consciousness is the precursor that allows us to "constantly think . . .  
about and mak[e] something of our lives, self-making being one of the bases of history" 
(3), and the novel provides "the Western aesthetic form that offers the largest and most 
complex image of ourselves that we have" (5). Postmodernist literature mirrors Said's 
notion of a "late style that involves a non-harmonious, nonserene tension, and above all, a 
sort of deliberately unproductive productiveness going against . . .  " (On Late Style 7), 
which Ame De Boever views as "the novel's resistance against its biopolitical origins" 
(Narrative Care 10). This chapter explores the ways in which Defoe most clearly 
15 According to J.M. Coetzee, "[A) novel is ultimately nothing but a prose fiction of a certain length. It has 
no formal requirements to satisfy; to that extent, the question of whether X or Y is "really" a novel can't 
be very interesting" ("Voice and Trajectory" 88). What is interesting is the ways in which the supposed 
origin of the English novel coincides with the foundation of (Foucauldian) biopolitical governance. 
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expressed the biopolitical nature of the English novel in A Journal of the Plague Year and 
Robinson Crusoe, as well as the "deliberately unproductive productiveness" of Coetzee's 
narrative style. In Foe and "He and His Man," Coetzee offers a leveling critique of the 
biopolitical dimensions of the l 8'h century Engli:sh novel, specifically through a 
postmodernist rewriting of the Robinson Crusoe myth. 
The "life-writing" (zoographein) of characters allows authors and their readers to 
question truth claims to experiment-individually and collectively-with what Foucault 
termed "technologies of the self," (or the "arts of living"). As Q.D. Leavis maintains, 
rather than reading commercialized fiction merely for entertainment, readers should 
instead read novels to "obtain assistance in the business of living" and "enrich the quality 
of living by extending, deepening, refining, coordinating experience" (Fiction and the 
Reading Public 48). In Narrative Care, De Boever explores the biopolitical aspects of 
authorship, most notably Foucauldian governmentality and care (caritas), to explore "the 
novel as a form of life-writing, a kind of aesthetic care of the self and of others" (8). 
But how is care connected with Foucault's notion of governmentality, biopolitics, 
and "technologies of the self' in the interconnected relationship among subjects and 
sovereigns, characters and authors? De Boever rightly insists that J.M. Coetzee's writings 
focus primarily on "the issue of character-being, in which all of us become one[,]" rather 
than simply postcolonial critique of subjective 'othering' . . .  (.] (T]he character-familiar, 
yet at the same time utterly strange; uncanny-is one of fiction's greatest mysteries" (47 
original emphasis). Sympathy, a sense of sameness, seems to be what attracts us to our 
literary counterparts. And yet difference is what public intellectuals such as Foucault, 
Derrida, Coetzee and Said wish to highlight-that is, in a nutshell, a move away from 
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coherence and certainty toward "intransigence, difficulty, and unresolved tension" (On 
late Style 7). This resulting tension of readers' contradictory position as both subject and 
object of interconnected matrices of power relations resembles Foucault's notion of 
governmentality in the age of biopolitics: 
[T]he situation of the character can be said to allegorize the modem, 
biopolitical condition . .  from above-we all enjoy being authors, being in 
the position of government, and seeing how character-lives unfold within 
the novel's programmed regulations; and . . .from below-we identify with 
characters, we recognize in their governed lives our own biopolitical 
condition. [Thus,] the novel enables us . . .  to experience the essentially 
modem experience of both being the subject of and being subjected to. 
(De Boever 4 7) 
Although De Boever study focuses on contemporary texts, he chooses Coetzee's Slow 
Man and Ishiguro's Never Let Me Go, loose adaptations of Robinson Crusoe and 
Frankenstein, both of which appear at the time when, according to Foucault, a "birth of 
biopolitics" was emerging. 
Defoe's fictions received canonized status, because, as Watt observes, "they are 
the first considerable narratives which embody all the elements of formal realism" (The 
Rise of the Novel 1 04). Since the modern novel's inception in late 1 7th/early 1 81h century, 
in England (contemporaneous with Foucauldian biopower and governmentality), 
novelists have found that readers appeal to claims of truth, especially when reading about 
exceptional circumstances involving incomparable characters, such as Robinson Crusoe. 
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Working for several publications and publishing dozens of pamphlets throughout his life, 
Defoe was "resolv'd to commit [his ideas] to Paper. . .  and leave, at least, a testimony of 
good Will to [his] Fellow Creatures" (qtd. in Preface A Journal of the Plague Year). 
Defoe uniyudy channeled his journalistic flair toward his novels, presenting them as 
either written by the protagonists or carefully compiled from historical evidence. In fact, 
historians continue to validate much of the information presented in A Journal oft he 
Plague Year ( 1 722), a "fictionalized" account of H.F. 's (presumably Defoe's uncle, 
Henry Foe) experience with the outbreak of the Bubonic Plague ( 1 665) in London. 
Scripted in journalistic fashion, Defoe heartily argued the veracity of A Journal of 
a Plague Year and Robinson Crusoe, which piqued the interest of readers so much that, 
as Coetzee notes, "[T]here are people all over the world who believe that Robinson 
Crusoe was written by Robinson Crusoe[,]" due to the monumental effort Defoe exerted 
"into making the reader believe that the Journal of the Plague Year was written in the 
1 660s, . . .  " and that Robinson Crusoe represented historical fact ("Voice and Trajectory" 
87). 16 Elaborating on the precarious division of history and fiction, Coetzee shows how, 
"when the crunch comes, the relation between history and fiction is still a rivalrous one . . .  
16 The historicity granted to Defoe's works reflect Edward Said's concern for young students [who] are 
slowly imbued with the sense that the history, or tradition, or great books that they study in school are 
The history, The tradition, The books, and that what they don't get or don't find out about till much later 
is, in their view, likely to be somehow hostile, or barbaric, or perhaps even inferior. That has been the 
problem with Eurocentrism whose ravages include such spoliations of human history as slavery, 
colonialism, Orientalism and racism" ("The Book, Critical Performance, and the Future of Education" (17). 
[;] [h]istorians are debating not only what should be an appropriate subject for history, 
but how to represent the past as well" ("Voice and Trajectory" 101  ) .  
48 
Coetzee argues the merits of narrative as opposed to "discursive models in the 
human sciences [,]" as "fictional narratives have the power to "abandon . . .  the support that 
comes with a certain institutional voice, the voice of the historian or sociologist or 
whatever . . .  [, and] . . .  entails no longer being an expert, no longer being master of your 
discourse" ("Voice and Trajectory" 1 0  I) .  Coetzee considers the use of narrative models 
in anthropology and archeology as progressive, "[b]ut these instances don't persuade me 
that the grand discourses have yet been abandoned in favor of narrative, narrative with all 
its implications understood and embraced and appreciated . . .  " ( 1 0 1 ). In other words, 
novels have the capacity to genealogically critique, even deconstruct, "grand narratives" 
of history by questioning the frequently attributed a priori status of institutionalized 
knowledge-i.e., truth claims and norms. 
For Foucault, biopolitics was anticipated by the overarching problem of 
government, which "must be allowed the very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth 
century": 
'Government' did not refer only to political structures or to the 
management of states; rather, it designated the way in which 
the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed-the 
government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick . . .  To 
govern, in this sense, is to control the possible field of action of 
others. ("The Subject and Power" 790) 
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The word "govern/mentality" connotes both the act of governing and the mentality of 
government/ing-i.e., pondering the evolutionary nature of governing. Thus, it provides 
the methodological tools needed to analyze government as both a practice and a 
rationality from which to evaluate tht:: various ways in which subjectivity is formed 
through institutionalized norms. 
As De Boever illustrates in Narrative Care, Foucault's analysis offers an 
insightful lens from which to investigate the governmental relationship between author, 
character, and reader, as readers can't help but to "identify with characters . . .  and 
recognize in their governed lives our own biopolitical condition" (47). Just as 
governmentality concerns governing the lives of the masses and "program[ming] their 
freedom of movement" ( 45) by regulating biological concerns, such as health and 
reproduction, authors reflectively administer the lives of their characters based on a 
(sub)conscious reflection of biopolitical governance-the rift that occurs in "our 
essentially modem condition of being the subject of and being subjected to" ( 47). 
Crusoe's status as both prisoner and Sovereign shows Defoe's awareness of the 
precarious balance between Sovereignty and govern.mentality, a theme which Coetzee 
applies to authorship by disrupting the power relations between author and authored as a 
means of questioning the sovereignty of authorship. 
Rather than the nature of power relations, as is commonly supposed, "[Foucault's] 
objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects" ("The Subject and Power" 777). Foucault's 
suppositions interestingly apply to the supposed origins of the novel, as early authors 
seemingly mirrored the emerging mentality of government in l 81h-century England, by 
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determining the best ways to imitate provincial life, along with the various options with 
which to govern disparate characters' every possible field of action (in the process 
revealing the various disciplinary modes of normalization) using veridiction (judiciously 
weighing possible truth claims) rather than objective claims of "Truth." The English 
novel not only allowed writers to entertain readers by staging various relatable passions, 
but also by critiquing biopolitical logic through characters who subjectively navigate 
their respective worlds equipped with little more than empirical reasoning. The 
"Odysseused" Crusoe has no Athena, only willful invocations to Providence that demand 
self-disciplined penance. He must script his own tabula rasa in isolation through a 
delicate balance between reasoned reflection, perpetual labor, and creature comforts 
attained through "technologies of the self," such as keeping a journal. 
Foucault's work is, in his words, the culmination of his efforts "to analyze these 
so-called sciences [economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology] as very 
specific 'truth games' related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand 
themselves" ("Technologies of the Self' 17-18). In light of our inevitable socio-cultural 
subjectivization, his last years were devoted to examining the philosophical evolution of 
"care of the self' (epimeleia heautou), a familiar expression of ancient Greece and Rome. 
Foucault conceptually uses the term "technology," significantly highlighting its 
etymological root, techne (craft, art), the term ancient Greeks used to denote the 
knowledge and tangible methods used to accomplish an objective. Because philosophy 
for the ancient Greeks was understood as the craft of constructing a virtuous life, the self, 
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in this context, is the work of art to be perfected; 17 Foucault considered Socrates one who 
championed philosophy as a technology of living (techne tou biou), which is contingent 
upon the care of the self. For the ancient Greeks, Poiesis (from the ancient Greek term 
nottco, meaning "to make") signified creative production. Hence, when examined 
biopolitically, the novel is the resultingpoiesis, created via the (techne) necessary to 
produce (and optimize) a mimetic form of living art. 
But how does the notion of the biopolitical governance of nationalized populaces 
relate to authors' notion of care? As Defoe said in Serious Reflections, "But what can 
kings, or queens, or parliaments do? Laws and proclamations are weak and useless 
things, unless some secret influence can affect the practices of those whom no laws can 
reach" (26). Defoe's "secret influence" may very well point to his notion of the novel, as 
fiction can help readers negotiate their own truth with hyperbolic examples of allegorical 
merit. Writers such as Defoe pondered the "technologies of the self' by scripting 
characters who sought to (re)make themselves in a balance between Providence, Fortune 
and Reason, and perhaps most important of all, Economy.18 Although Robinson Crusoe-
the paradigm of Lockean property rights-relies on reasoned judgment (using acquired 
technology from sunken ships) to manage madness in solitude, he praises Providence. 
The biopolitical logic of his historical milieu ultimately directs his course of action-the 
germs of consumer capitalism are reflected in his continual trial and error method of 
17 Virtue, for the ancient Greeks, was generally synonymous with beauty, goodness, and truth, all of which 
can be attained through dedication to knowledge and care of the self. 
18 Crusoe embodies what Foucault considers "'economism' in the theory of power [,) [meaning he 
regards) power ... as a right which can be possessed in the way one possesses a commodity ... (.] The 
constitution of political power is therefore ... modeled on a juridical operation similar to an exchange of 
contracts [,) [revealing] an obvious analogy between power and commodities, between power and 
wealth" (Society Must Be Defended 13). 
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negotiating loss versus gain, or as he articulates, "on the Credit Side of the Accompf' 
(54). 
Capitalism, according to Foucault, "would not have been possible without the 
controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the 
phenomena of population to economic processes" ( 140-41 ). And capitalism, as Marx 
points out, thrives on excess, demanding growth. The competitive drive to continuously 
produce more goods and capital to meet the desires of the consumer ultimately relies on a 
power capable of fostering, optimizing, and regulating life rather than death (The History 
of Sexuality: Vol. I 14 1 ) .  In short, an economic rationale operating on the notion of 
governing less within programmed relations, what Foucault called "a certain 'freedom of 
movement (laisser passer), in the sense of "letting things take their course"' became, 
according to Foucault, the rationality of governance at the dawn of the l 81h century (De 
Boever 37). 
Reflecting this logic by establishing a thriving economic model (as well as a 
modest fortune) based on the foundations of the invisible hand of laissez faire capitalism, 
Crusoe, as a prototypical homo economicus, applies the commercial method of 
bookkeeping (determining loss vs. gain, or in his words, "Good" vs. "Evil") to every 
decision, no matter how trivial: 19 
Upon the whole, here was an undoubted Testimony, that there was scarce 
any Condition in the World so miserable, but there was something 
19 Derrida observes, "Robinson Crusoe is not only a model of education, but is still today an information 
manual and novel of education for students of political economy, on the origin of exchange and use value, 
on labor, on stock raising, etc" (The Beast and The Sovereign 378-79). See M. V. White's "Robinson 
Crusoe" in The New Pa/grave: A Dictionary of Economics. 
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Negative or something Positive to be thankful for in it. . .  [.] [We] may 
always find in [miserable conditions] something to comfort our selves 
from, and to set in the Description of Good and Evil, on the Credit Side of 
the Accompt." (my emphasis 54) 
Defoe notably blends his notion of regimented survival with economic and religious 
phrasing. Rather than a treatise of sheer faith in Providence to attain hope in the midst of 
desperation, Crusoe's journal, along with Defoe's prolific collection of works, represent 
Foucault's view of "[w]riting['s]. . .  importan[ce] in the culture of taking care of 
oneself . . .  (.] [T]aking care involved taking notes on oneself to be reread, writing treatises 
and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for 
oneself the truths one needed" ("Technologies of the Self' 27). Crusoe's journal lies 
within the larger chronicle of Robinson Crusoe-a journal within a journal-the latter an 
extended form of the mainly objective reflections/recordings of the former. One could 
say that Robinson Crusoe is Defoe's "novel" form of "caring for the self'-both 
economically, as a dissenting author who was in constant fear of debtor's prison, as well 
as philosophically, as a reflectively "reasoned" treatise on the merits and spiritual 
confines of solitude. 
Defoe, eponymously writing as Robinson Crusoe, who he has defend the 
moralistic merits of his allegorical exploits, distinguishes Robinson Crusoe and Serious 
Reflections from satire, arguing, 
The selling or writing a parable, or an illusive allegoric history, is quite a 
different case, and is always distinguished from this other jesting with 
truth, that it is designed and effectually turned for instructive and upright 
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ends, and has its moral justly applied. Such are the historical parables in 
the Holy Scripture, such 'The Pilgrim's Progress,' and such, in a word, the 
adventures of your fugitive friend, 'Robinson Crusoe.' (Serious 
Reflections) 
It seems that Defoe wanted his writings to set an example through the notion of an 
exception: Crusoe's and H.F. 's cases are exceptional-willed and sustained efficiency in 
absolute isolation and an unshakable determination to withstand and report on an 
epidemic, respectively. Authors must be imaginative enough to allow readers to 
vicariously experience the sometimes-desperate condition of often peerless characters, 
which allows them to sympathize with the restraints and advantages of biopolitical 
regimentation. Coetzee illustrates this necessity for the sympathetic imagination in "He 
and His Man" when Crusoe, author of desolate characters like himself (including Defoe), 
writes that, 
a visitation by illness may be figured as a visitation by the devil, or by a 
dog figuring the devil, and vice versa, the visitation figured as an illness, 
as in the saddler's history of the plague; and therefore that no one who 
writes stories of either, the devil or the plague, should forthwith be 
dismissed as a forger or a thief. 
While novelists undoubtedly incorporate "Surprising" (exaggerated for sympathetic 
affect) elements in their texts, fictions allow us to differentiate what Defoe calls a story's 
"application" from its "relation." 
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Defoe divides "moral" from "fable" ("application" from "relation") in the preface 
to Moll Flanders ( 1722) and even claims to have written Serious Reflections, the 
concluding treatise in the Robinson Crusoe trilogy, as the moral from which the fable 
(Rubinson Crusoe) sprung. Vehemently defending the status of Robinson Crusoe from 
critics who deemed it superfluous "romance," as well as from inept imitators, Defoe 
famously responded that "it is as reasonable to represent one kind of imprisonment by 
another, as it is to represent anything that really exists by that which exists not" 
("Robinson Crusoe's Preface" Serious Reflections), signifying an argument for, as 
Maximillian E. Novak observes, "a serious type of fiction sustained by a vivid method of 
representation," achieved by using literary hybridity to establish an augmented form of 
narrative that blurs the line between fact and fiction (538). Defoe viewed allegory (or 
what today we would more generally term "symbolic representation") as the foundational 
merit of Robinson Crusoe, alluding to all the ways in which Crusoe's plight represented 
the developmental care of oneself through a labored acquisition of property. 
Ever the outspoken, moralizing writer-despite being jailed several times for 
what was then, under sovereignty, considered seditious libel20-Defoe was often charged 
by authorities and critics alike with propagating rumor. A Journal of the Plague Year 
20 Showing how the notion of authorship emerged from (and still functions as) a logic of appropriation 
based on prohibition and exclusion, Foucault argues in "What is an Author" that because 
books or texts with authors ... are objects of appropriation ... [,] [their] status as property is historically 
secondary to the penal code controlling (their] appropriation. Speeches and books were assigned real 
authors, other than mythical or important religious figures, only when the author became subject to 
punishment and to the extent that (her or] his discourse was considered transgressive. (124) 
Defoe knew all too well the punitive risk his political writings carried. He was imprisoned several times 
both for debt and, in one case, for seditious libel by the Tory Ministry after publishing the satirical 
pamphlet, The Shortest-Way with the Dissenters; Or, Proposols for the Establishment of the Church that 
was, at first, ironically taken seriously and lauded by the Ministry. 
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begins with Defoe's wry confession that in 1665, "We had no such things as printed 
News Papers . . .  to spread Rumors and Reports of Things; and to Improve them by the 
Invention of Men, as I have liv'd to see practis'd since" (5).2 1  Driven by what seems to be 
his journalistic duty, H.F. chooses to remain amid plague-ridden England, erring on the 
side of natural explanations for the pestilence rather than divine punishment, as was all 
too common throughout the l 7th_ J gth centuries. 
While Crusoe claims that all he can say to that which puzzles him is "to describe 
the Fact[s]" and "[l]et the Naturalists [those that believe that all phenomena have natural 
causes] explain these things, and the Reason and Manner of them" ( 1 47), H.F. 
confidently asserts that "as a Distemper arising from natural Causes, we must consider 
[the Plague] as it was really propagated by natural Means, nor is it at all less a Judgment 
for its being under the Conduct of humane Causes and Effects" (1 53). Defoe does not 
neglect to mention "Providence," but still insists on empirically forming educated 
hypotheses based on careful observation and reflection: 
Tho' Providence seem'd to direct my Conduct to be otherwise; yet it is my 
opinion . . . that the best Physick against the Plague is to run away from it. I 
know People encourage themselves, by saying, God is able to keep up us 
in the midst of Danger. . .  ; and this kept Thousands in the Town, whose 
Carcasses went into the great Pits by Cart Loads. [But] were this very 
Fundamental only duly considered . . .  on any future occasion of this, or the 
like Nature, I am persuaded it would put them upon quite different 
21 See Blakey Vermeule's Why Do We Care About literary Characters for a provocative analysis of rumor, a 
seemingly innate human response to others that reflects our curiously imitative nature; see also Coetzee's 
Slow Man (135-36). 
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Measures for managing the People, from those that they took in 1665 . . .  in 
a Word, they would consider of separating the People into smaller bodies, 
and removing them in time farther from one another. ( 1 56) 
Defoe continues his judicious critique of England's administrative follies in regulating 
the populace, especially the poor, arguing the importance of establishing preventive 
biopolitical "Measures for managing the People": 
Surely never City, at least, of this Bulk and Magnitude, was taken in a 
Condition so perfectly unprepar'd for such a dreadful Visitation ... [.] The 
Lord Mayor and Sheriffs had made no Provisions as Magistrates for [the 
enforcement of] the Regulations which were to be observed . . .  The Citizens 
had no publick Magazines, or Store-Houses for Corn, or Meal, for the 
Subsistence of the Poor; which, if they had provided themselves, as in 
such Cases is done abroad, many miserable Families, who were now 
reduc'd to the utmost Distress, would have been reliev'd, and that in a 
better Manner, than now could be done. (77) 
As in the above passage, Defoe frequently offers objective guidance for future calamities 
of immense implication (Journal 156), while at the same time praising London's 
managerial capacities, as "Every thing was managed with so must care . . .  that London 
may be a Pattern to all the Cities in the World for the good Government and excellent 
Order that was everywhere kept. . .  " ( 1 56). 
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Forever attempting to balance objectivity with hardened subjective analysis, H.F. 
praises "the Prudence of the Magistrates" for "[t]he Moderation which they used in the 
great and difficult work of shutting up of Houses" though he later reveals, 
that the shutting up of Houses thus by force, and restraining, or rather 
imprisoning people in their own Houses . . .  was of little or no service in the 
Whole; nay, . . .  it was rather hurtful, having forc'd those desperate People 
to wander abroad with the Plague upon them, who would otherwise have 
died quietly in their beds. (61) 
Presenting a character who is both subjective and objective, of the past ( 1665) and the 
present ( 1 722), Defoe relies on fiction to script a plea toward vigilance in the event of 
another epidemic like that of the plague or the great fire that ravaged London only a year 
later, in 1 666-a plea for the biopolitical optimization of life (especially of the poor) 
rather than hardened disciplinary manners.22 Rather than merely writing to attain care of 
the self, Defoe seemed to view the novel as a hybridized form of fictionalized facts from 
which to spread objective scrutiny for all readers. 
Despite largely dissenting against the norms by which they are governed, early 
novels could not escape the stereotypical truth claims that dominated the "Enlightened" 
period from which they emerged, i.e., the dominant positon of subjective generalizations 
governed by "objective" empirical reasoning. Throughout his works, Coetzee exposes the 
22 Like Dr. Rieux in Camus' The Plague, H.F. "resolved to compile this chronicle, so that he should not be 
one of those who hold their peace but should bear witness in favor of those plague stricken people; so 
that some memorial of the injustice and outrage done them might endure; and to state quite simply what 
we learn in time of pestilence: that there are more things to admire in men than to despise" (Camus 308). 
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ways in which our subconscious desires must be exposed to the ways in which reason 
fails, which he "dictates" through an often-uncomfortable literary experience that 
portrays characters as living ironies in ill-ended attempts at achieving substance. In Foe, 
Coetzee displaces l 81h-century truth claims23 by presenting Susan Barton's tale of finding 
herself on a deserted island with Cruso24 and Friday as anterior to Defoe's Robinson 
Crusoe: "Better had there been only Cruse and Friday,' you will murmur to yourself: 
Better without the woman" (72). Susan's fear that Foe will cut her out of her own 
narrative is realized by the fact that she does not appear in Robinson Crusoe, though the 
blueprint for Defoe's tale is contained in one of her many letters to Foe. Foe's 
appropriation of Susan's tale, and what appears to be Susan's bouts of "madness," 
challenges the notion of verifiable historical narratives that dominate and tend to silence 
the stories of those exploited and scapegoated in the name of competitive commercialized 
expansion-or more plainly, book sales! 
In Foe, Susan Barton, the source of (De)Foe's legendary tale, convinces Foe to 
write her story (as she lacks the artistic flair, and, as an unknown woman, the same means 
as Foe to be a successful novelist) with two concerns in mind-her urgent sense of 
responsibility to discover "a means of giving voice to Friday" and for Foe to 
imaginatively "return to me the substance I have lost . . .  [.] For though my story gives the 
truth, it does not give the substance of the truth" (5 1 ). The notion of agency in Foe is 
interesting when compared to writing a novel, as the prominent "people" Susan 
23 Coetzee's fascination with 18th-century prose (Defoe, Swift, Newton, and Gibbon) is especially evident 
in three linguistic essays, The Agentless Sentence as Rhetorical Device" (1980), "The Rhetoric of the 
Passive in English" (1980), and "Newton and the Ideal of a Transparent Scientific Language" (1982). 
24 "Cruso" and "Foe" are both Coetzee's spelling. 
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encounters are all, like her, fictional characters whose "substance" is not only determined 
by Defoe, but also the various readers who have interpreted their plight since their 
literary birth, just as she considers Friday's life contingent upon his knowledge of the 
spoken word. Coetzee essentially critiques the biopolitics of authorship (and more 
specifically, of l 81h century claims of objective historicity) by authoring Susan, who, in 
an attempt to validate her existence, both narrative and "actual," fruitlessly tries to 
authorially "optimize"-seemingly for his own good-Friday into a "civilized" being in 
England, endowed with speech, and eventually, by Foe's suggestion, writing. Susan's 
obsessive quest for a "true" narrative remains futile; the various questions she asks to 
"decipher"25 the mysteries surrounding her island existence remain unanswered.26 As 
Foe, alluding to the sovereignty of language, inquires of Susan, "as it was a slaver's 
stratagem to rob Friday of his tongue, may it not be a slaver's stratagem to hold him in 
subjection while we cavil over words in a dispute we know to be endless" ( 1 50). 
Mirroring Defoe's situation as both a novelist and seeker of truth, Coetzee vividly 
depicts "author" Susan's conundrum of producing a new brand of formal realism that 
25 Interestingly, an antiquated definition of "cipher" is "zero," a concept Coetzee thematically plays with 
throughout Foe regarding Susan and Foe's attempts to "decode" Friday. While Susan, who views "[l]etters 
[as) the mirror of words" (142), values speech over the written word, Foe, in a manner that Derrida would 
certainly applaud, argues that, "Writing is not doomed to be the shadow of speech ... [.) Speech is but a 
means through which the word may be uttered, it is not the word itself." (142-43). And Friday, not 
unintelligent, but simply seemingly unhindered enough in his sense of self, appeals to the language of the 
body, that is, auditory and visual perception, by periodically playing a rudimental tune on his flute, 
dancing to unheard melodies, and drawing pictures of feet covered with eyes. 
26 "What was the meaning of the terraces?" "How did Friday lose his tongue?" "Why did Friday submit to 
Cruso?" "Why did neither Cruso nor Friday desire her?" "What was the meaning of Friday's act of 
scattering petals on the water near the site where she Imagines they were shipwrecked?" 
must also sell, which seems to be why she sought out Foe in the first place. Susan 
wonders, after relating her year of "strange circumstances" on the island, 
how long before I am driven to invent new and stranger 
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circumstances . . .  [,] [such as] the salvaging of tools and muskets from 
Crusoe's ship; the building of a boat, or at least a skiff, and a venture to 
sail to the mainland; a landing by cannibals on the island, followed by a 
skirmish and many bloody deaths; and, at last, the coming of a golden­
haired stranger with a sack of com, and the planting of the terraces? Alas, 
will the day ever arrive when we can make a story without strange 
circumstances? (67) 
Susan's examples of exaggeration for the sake of entertainment, of course, humorously 
match the main events of Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, leaving readers to ponder the 
shadowy concept of narrative origins-who narrated whom into life. 
Largely a critique of the novel's complicity with biopolitical regimentation, 
Coetzee's works demonstrate poststructuralist conceptions of authorship and language 
exemplified by what Barthes calls scriptable (or "writerly" forms of fiction), a 
democratic means of displacing the authorial imbalance between author and reader. In 
writerly novels, Marina Mackay notes, "meaning is never self-evident but something you 
have to labor to produce, with no expectation that the meaning you derive is anything like 
the meanings made by other readers . . .  [.) [Thus,] all texts are by definition intertextual, 
fundamentally citational" ( 1 53). Foe is a paradigm of the novel's capability of offering 
resistance (immunity, if you will) against its biopolitical origins-that is, its complicity 
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with dominant historical narratives, such as Crusoe's project of authoring his own 
historicized tale of colonial (self)-"improvement." Barthes illustrates how authorship is 
not an autonomous force of creation, but relies primarily on readers, who interpret texts 
anew (depending on socio-cultural circumstance, environs, state of mind, and so on) with 
each reading. The author, for Barthes, is merely a "scripter" whose "authority" is limited 
to the many meanings assigned by a multiplicity of readers. For Barthes, the origin of a 
text "is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the 
Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them 
original, blend and clash" ("The Death of the Author" 146). Coetzee exposes authors' 
control of their characters not by showing textual unity, but by exposing characters' 
desire for objectivity and corporeality-an ontologically (rather than merely historically) 
meaningful existence unhindered by linguistic and phenomenological barriers of living in 
and being of a world where Cartesian certainty has "returned to" existential doubt. 
With his use of Crusoe in Foe and in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in 
Literature, "He and His Man," J.M. Coetzee explores the concept of authoring life by 
exposing the surreal link between author and character. Crusoe is, in a sense, Defoe's 
"man" in the same way that Friday is Crusoe's, and to illustrate this point, Coetzee 
prefaces his reading with the following quote from Robinson Crusoe: 
But to return to my new companion. I was greatly delighted with him, and 
made it my business to teach him everything that was proper to make him 
useful, handy, and helpful; but especially to make him speak, and 
understand me when I spoke; and he was the aptest scholar there ever was. 
( 164) 
Defoe depicts Friday as a wholly subservient servant who passively allows Crusoe to 
endow him with a rudimentary language of acquiescence, just as Crusoe and Friday, as 
fictional characters, are at the whim of Defoe's imagination. 
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Coetzee dislocates the authority of canonical history, exemplified in world­
renowned novels like Robinson Crusoe, which appropriate the ultimately "colonized" 
narratives of those marginalized by Eurocentric colonial discourse (in what Derrida calls 
the phallologocentric tradition of Western discourse), such as Friday (a Carib) and Susan 
(a woman). Susan, as both subject of her own substance and subjected to the whims of 
Foe's literary imagination, never fails to give up the fight for control of her story. 
Similarly, Friday's silence remains his source of power, only accessible in the form of a 
dream wherein an unnamed narrator metaphorically "slip[s] overboard" ( 1 55) into what 
may perceived to be Susan's narrative in an attempt to find Friday's missing voice. 
Susan's refusal to acknowledge the young Susan Barton, who she labels "father-born" 
(91), indicating that she is a product of (De)Foe's imagination, and the ways in which she 
gains temporary power through a sexualized portrayal of gender reversal, challenges the 
biopolitical regulation of "authorized" historical voices. 
Coetzee demonstrates the power of narrative to re-contextualize the ways in 
which history writes us into life, notably through the eyes of a female castaway whose 
origins remain unknown. Coetzee's novels are filled with the motif of authorship as birth, 
regeneration, and the continuity of life in general. Susan wishes to father her own story, 
evident when Susan revels at "tak[ing] out a clean sheet of paper and dip(ping] it in 
[Foe's] ink-your pen, your ink[,] feeling as if "the pen becomes (hers] as [she] write[s] 
with it, as though growing out of (her] hand-and wr[iting] at the head" (67). Susan 
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battles to birth her own narrative using the phallic image of Foe's pen; but (De)Foe, 
Susan's foe for an authoritative voice of authenticity, favors the elusive Cruso(e) as 
protagonist of "his" tale. In a desperate attempt to ensure she maintains some semblance 
of control over the rights of her story, Susan mounts Foe "(which he did not seem easy 
with, in a womanY' ( 1 39), claiming the status of a Muse, who "must do whatever lies in 
her power to father her offspring" (1 40); after which, Foe, lamenting his status as an 
author of second-hand tales, labels himself as "an old whore who should ply her trade 
only in the dark" ( 1 5 1 ). Susan goes so far as to refer to Foe as her "mistress" and "wife" 
( 1 52), indicating she has not given up the rights to her "offspring," her story. 
The novel mimics our inherent desire to validate truth claims through competing 
perspectives that all vie for positions of power. As both subjects and objects of power 
relations that determine our subjectivity, we must actively navigate and create our own 
"substance." Although, as Coetzee illustrates, this self-realization often occurs by 
exploitative means that stifle the continuity of life freed from prescribed (normalized) 
standards of being. Through Susan's desperation for substance, Coetzee metafictionally 
exposes the complex nature of his literary inventions, who, though they are products of 
Defoe's imagination, seem content with their lot: Susan's supposed daughter (Susan 
Barton, Jr.) and Amy, the housekeeper, are lifted from Defoe's Roxana ( 1 724); the young 
pickpocket at Foe's service is the young Captain Jack (from Colonel Jack 1 722); even 
Mrs. Veal, the apparition from Defoe's famous "apparition narrative," The Apparition of 
Mrs. Veal, is referenced by Susan, who reads the moralistic tale in Foe to Friday. Unlike 
her fictional counterparts, Susan feels her story is incomplete (hence rendering her into a 
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spectral presence). Susan obsesses over the desires of friday, whom she feels compelled 
to care for and equip with speech: 
The story I desire to be known by is the story of the island. You call it an 
episode, but I call it a story in its own right. It commences with my being 
cast away there and concludes with the death of Cruso and the return of 
Friday and myself to England, full of new hope. Within this larger story 
are inset the stories of how I came to be marooned (told by myself to 
Cruso) and of Cruse's shipwreck and early years on the island (told by 
Cruse to myself), as well as the story of Friday which is properly not a 
story but a puzzle or hole in the narrative. ( 12 1 )  
Susan uses a "practical" approach (similar to that of Cruso and Crusoe) to fill Friday's 
narrative gap, which, as she admits, is primarily to substantiate her island narrative 
(which, as a literary character, means her existence): "The true story will not be heard till 
by art we have found a means of giving voice to Friday" ( 1 1 8)-that is, through regular 
speech and writing lessons. 
Elizabeth Costello-Coetzee's recurring literary alter-ego-seems to embody 
Foe's attitude toward novel-writing as, in his words, a "rambling . . .  occupation" similar to 
"conjuring" ( 1 35), comparing Susan's island narrative to "a loaf of bread . . .  [that] will 
keep us alive, certainly, if we are starved of reading; but who would prefer it when there 
are tastier confections and pastries to be had" ( 1 17)? Costello explains to Paul Rayment, 
the protagonist of her latest novel, that "[she] couldn't care less if [he] tell[s] [her] made­
up stories. Our lies reveal as much about us as our truths" (Slow Man 203)-to which 
Paul responds, "If truth and lies are the same, then speech and silence may as well be the 
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same too" (203). Friday's silence is a figure for the "truth" that Susan futilely seeks for 
(and of) herself, of which language is helpless to decipher. Her insistence that Foe place 
the island as the central event is honored at the expense of her absence from the novel. It 
seems that Foe regard� Susan's narrative unmarketable if it is not centered on her search 
for her lost daughter, with the island episode, as Foe sees it, "properly the second part of 
the middle[,]" serving as a climax for "the reversal in which the daughter takes up the 
quest abandoned by her mother" ( 1 1 7). 
Susan willfully "endeavors to be father to [her] story" ( 1 23), and her rejection of 
young Susan as her daughter-along with Amy and Jack as no more than Foe's 
"actors"-reflects her refusal of Defoe's suggested narrative. The question as to whose 
narrative is truthful remains unanswered, as there are no reliable narrators in Foe, save 
for Friday's undecipherable voice that gets the final word, emitting a 
stream without breath without interruption. It flows up through his body 
and out upon me; it passes through the cabin, through the wreck; washing 
the cliffs and shores of the island, it runs northward and southward to the 
ends of the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against my 
eyelids, against the skin of my face. ( 1 57) 
The surreal ending to Foe favors Friday's inaccessible voice over the contending 
authorial voices of Foe and Susan-a voice of the "body" that seems to evoke, at least in 
the unnamed narrator of the ethereal world of the abyss, not a rationalized but a corporeal 
response of tears that "beat . . .  against my eyelids, against the skin of my face" ( 1 57). 
Stretching from his island existence "to the ends of the earth" (Susan's supposed missing 
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link of "truth"), Friday's narrative emotionally overpowers the appropriative authority of 
language itself in favor of a candid diffusion of inexpressible truth. 
Coetzee il lustrates the paradox of using "dead letters" as mediums from which to 
experiment with the project of creating literary life. Writers as varied as Derrida, 
Foucault, Borges, and Coetzee all reflect the ways in which language refers back to its 
own absence in an attempt to escape its own finitude, often symbolized in Coetzee's 
novels as a God-shaped hole signifying the absence of purpose or sense of being whole. 
Susan Barton vividly articulates the conundrum of substantializing oneself into being 
through an authentic narrative, a project she obsessively practices on Friday. Despite her 
tireless attempt to decipher the substantiality of the illusory world she inhabits, Susan 
metamorphoses into "doubt itself': 
[A]ll my life grows to be story and there is nothing of my own left to me. I 
thought I was myself and this girl a creature of another order speaking 
words you made up for her. . . [.) I am doubt itself. Who is speaking me? 
Am I a phantom too? To what order do I belong? And you? Who are you? 
( 1 33) 
Ever ambiguous about her own existence, Susan's questions are directed not only to Foe, 
but also outside the text to Coetzee-himself subjected to supervisory societal 
structures-who "scripts" her into a narrative inhabited by Defoe's fictional characters, 
all of whom, while seemingly fictional in Foe, nevertheless are substantial: "We are all 
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alive, we are all substantial, we are all in the same world" ( 1 52).27 It seems that Susan's 
realization spawns from her acknowledgment of her own existence-and the culmination 
of that which she considers "spectral"-as bearing historical materiality. In Foe, Coetzee 
challenges the Western world's cla!>sical foundation of reason-based objectivity with a 
cipher, a narrative of pure metaphor, bereft of signification, "where bodies [in this 
instance, textual "bodies"] are their own signs" (Foe 157). 
Just as Coetzee, in Foe, inverted the authorial power between Susan and Foe, and 
ultimately, between himself and Defoe, he challenges the supposed sovereignty of 
authorship in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, "He and His Man" by displacing the 
author/character relationship between Defoe and Crusoe. Defoe, "His [Crusoe's] Man"-
"that dapper little man with the quick step and the mole upon his chin"-busily sends 
reports to "He," presented by Coetzee as an aged, world-weary Robinson Crusoe living in 
England. Crusoe creates characters in desperate situations comparable to his crushing 
isolation on the island. And although he is certainly morose, "the writing of his 
adventures has put him in the habit of writing, it is a pleasant enough recreation. In the 
evening by candlelight he will take out his papers and sharpen his quills and write a page 
or two of his man . . .  this busy man of his." 
While "Poor Crusoe" prefers silence and isolation to speech and company, he 
practices "technologies of the selr' when he biopolitically negotiates the fate of the 
"characters" related to him by "His Man": 
27 Susan's supposed daughter and Amy, the housekeeper, are lifted from Defoe's Roxana {1724), the 
young pickpocket at Foe's service is the young Captain Jack (from Colonel Jack 1722); even Mrs. Veal, the 
apparition from Defoe's famous "apparition narrative," The Apparition of Mrs. veal, is referenced by 
Susan, who reads the moralistic tale in Foe to Friday. 
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A man of business, he thinks to himself. Let him be a man of business, a 
grain merchant or a leather merchant, let us say; or a manufacturer and 
purveyor of roof tiles somewhere where clay is plentiful.  . .  Make him 
prosperous . . .  [,] gi Vt! him a reasonable happiness; then bring his happiness 
suddenly to an end . . .  [:] he is ruined, this man of his, debtors descend upon 
him like flies or like crows, he has to flee his home, his wife, his children, 
and seek hiding in the most wretched of quarters in Beggars Lane under a 
false name and in disguise. 
Crusoe's "Man" not only reflects Defoe's struggles with, and desires to overcome, his 
constant struggles with debt, but also to, more generally, what Paul Rayment-the 
protagonist of Coetzee' s Slow Man-refers to as a "biologico-literary experiment" ( 1 1 4) 
in relation to Elizabeth Costello's (his "author's") unusual form of caritas. It seems that, 
unlike Paul, neither Defoe nor Crusoe can escape their dreams of meeting their respective 
"authors," though they have symbolically authored one another through their narrativized 
visions of sympathetic longing. 
Coetzee presents Crusoe's "Man" (Defoe) as one who inhabits and reports on 
scenes and existential scenarios from the best-known canonical stories of Daniel Defoe: 
Robinson Crusoe and A Journal of a Plague Year. As "His Man" navigates the streets of 
London during the plague of 1665 (now representing the protagonist of A Journal of a 
Plague Year, H.F.), he reports of a woman who perceives a cloud as, "an angel in white 
brandishing a.flaming sword! ... [.] It is an allegory! cries the woman in the street; but he 
can see no allegory for the life of him. Thus in his report." It is up to Crusoe to unearth 
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the allegorical merit of "Defoe's" tales of woe:28 as a bystander declares in a narrative 
plucked from Robinson Crusoe, 
And all of this - the wave of water, the ruin, the flight, the pennilessness, 
the tatters, the solitude - let all of this be a figure of the shipwreck and the 
island where he, poor Robin, was secluded from the world for twenty-six 
years, till he almost went mad (and indeed, who is to say he did not, in 
some measure?) 
Everything related between Crusoe and Defoe is symbolic of their own suffering. "He" 
(Crusoe)-the authored author-inspired by the existentially leveling reports of "His 
Man" (Defoe), whom "He" equips with speech, attempts to mend the dissected self, 
seeking wholeness via written reflections of our (often universal) existential conundrums. 
Crusoe describes the plague as "a figure for life itself, the whole of life. Due preparation. 
We should make due preparation for death, or else be struck down where we stand." To 
"make due preparation for death" (a predictable part of life) means not only to face, but 
also analyze its inevitability from a pragmatic standpoint that programmatically 
calculates both statistical facts and introspective awareness-resembling a subject's 
journey through the biopolitical web of programmed relations that seek to optimize (and 
immunize) the life of a population. 
28 Coetzee explicitly argues that "Allegory is not, of course, about everywhere: it's just about somewhere 
else. I've always been slightly bemused by the description of me as an allegorist, but maybe I know less 
than other people do ("Voice and Trajectory" 97). If his messages are about everywhere, then objectivity 
seems to be the goal, but not in the sense of certainty, but questioning our subjectivity/supposed 
objectivity to displace our concretized belief systems, our avowal of the immutable self and its canonized 
narratives of mastery. 
Coetzee's "He" (Crusoe) illustrates the contagiously, self-reflective nature of 
which novels are capable, writing, seemingly to himself, that, 
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When I defended myself against the cannibals, who sought to strike me 
down and roast me and devour me, he wrote, I thought I defended myself 
against the thing itself. Little did I guess, he wrote, that these cannibals 
were but figures of a more devilish voracity, that would gnaw at the very 
substance of truth." (original emphasis) 
"The thing itself' remains shrouded in symbolic speculation, concealed by figures. 
Defoe's characters-as an extension of his drive to set didactic examples through 
formalized realism-ponder life and death with the utmost intensity, attaining life of their 
own that often ironically surpasses the status of their "author." But although Crusoe 
"writes as well or better than his master,'' his man's reports claim that "[o]nly when he 
yields himself up to this man of his do such words come" (6), leaving us to wonder, 
"How are they to be figured, this man and he? As master and slave? As brothers, twin 
brothers? As comrades in arms? Or as enemies, foes?" (8). Coetzee's questions challenge 
the notion of authorial origin, "offer[ing] a challenge to the hierarchical binaries of a 
master-slave dynamic and . . .  [resembling] the poststructuralist notion of the writer as a 
scripter who is spoken by tradition and discourse itself' (Lucy Graham my emphasis 
225)-"scripters" who, in an attempt to challenge the stifling contradictions to ethical 
objectivity (in the sense of the interconnectedness of all life) that instrumental reason 
justifies, must invoke the "sympathetic imagination" through a deferral of reason in favor 
of a vicarious sense of mediated passion-what "civil ized" society is apt to label as 
bordering madness, hysteria, or at the very least, abnormality. 
72 
In "The Lives of Animals," a passionate diatribe against humanity's insistence 
on instrumental reason-that is, regarding and training animals based on humans' 
conception of scientifically-based reason as opposed to empathetic, emotional 
awareness-Elizabeth Costello ironically illustrates one may only deconstruct humanity's 
justification of anthropocentric reason by "using a process of careful reasoning" (Head 
1 1 1  ). Costello proposes, "(R]ather than the flowering of a faculty that allows access to 
the secrets of the universe, might not humanity's concept of itself as images of God 
[indicate] the specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition whose 
forte is reasoning" (69). 
Through the "life-writing" of his literary alter-ego, Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee 
highlights the contradiction in "the desire to promote the sympathetic capacity . . .  [,] for 
the sympathetic faculty, which the literary effect can promote, is identified by dint of 
intellectual effort" (Head 1 1 1 ) .  Costello makes a passionate case for emotional 
understanding through the powers of the heart, "the seat of. . .  sympathy . . .  that allows us at 
times to empathize with other forms of life, not just humans" (79). Writers such as Ted 
Hughes, explains Costello, bypass rationalistic (instrumental) classification with "poetic 
invention" to "show . . .  us how to bring the living body into being with ourselves" (98), 
which allows us to "think ourselves into the being of another. . .  [,] any being with whom 
[we] share the substrate of life" (80). 
Coetzee's oeuvre illustrates a distancing of authorial objectivity, and as a result, 
empirical certainty, in favor of a deconstructive examination of narrative play, wherein 
the notion of the "author" is replaced with "medium," a mediator of conflicting 
narratives-one who must acknowledge the futility of bypassing relativity in favor of 
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"truth," which Coetzee demonstrates by honoring without appropriating the voices of the 
"Other." In "At the Gate," a Kafkaesque depiction of Elizabeth Costello's final judgment, 
Costello must convince a panel of judges that she believes in something. Costello shapes 
her identity as an author, claiming she holds no beliefs and is a "secretary for the 
invisible," a term she "borrowed from a secretary of the higher order, Czeslaw Milosz, a 
poet. . .  to whom it was dictated years ago" (1 99) : "When I claim to be a secretary clean 
of belief I refer to my ideal self, a self capable of holding opinions and prejudices at bay 
while the world which it is her function to conduct passes through her" (200). The 
notable shift from first- to third-person indicates Susan's relinquishment of an authorial 
voice so she may "be a secretary clean of belief[,]" unhindered by unilateral affirmations, 
having (an albeit wavering) faith only in her conviction of being "open to all voices, not 
just the voices of the murdered and violated . . .  (.] I will not close my ears to them, I will 
not judge them" (204). Costello's status as a medium interestingly connotes those who 
communicate with spiritual presences, which relates to Barton's doubt in the "substance" 
of her "spectral" existence in relation to Foe's authorial power. 
Coetzee's works illustrate the lack of an author's sovereignty over narrative, and 
this symbolic "death of the author" resembles Foucault's beheaded sovereign king, an 
image he figuratively used to signify Sovereignty's integration into disciplinary 
techniques that determine subjectivity via the goal of enhancing (by "securing") life 
itself. The l 81h-century novel's emergence opened a space for novelists to aesthetically 
and philosophically "play" with the notion of govern.mentality and care using characters 
that are reflections of the societal constraints of a "brave new world," where the 
politicization of life itself in the age of "governing less" was taking hold on social 
consciousness. Complementing Barthes' reader-centered approach to authorship, 
Foucault's notion of governmentality's allowance of a "certain ' freedom of movement' 
(laisser passer)" reflects the novelist's biopolitical project of "scripting" the fate of 
characters who, though their narratives are far from unilaterally interpreted, are 
nonetheless governed by the "staged passions" of their "authors." 
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Though they should not be perceived as writers' autonomous creations, fictional 
characters begin as psychological projections of their authors but remain mutable 
constructions reflective of various perspectives that inevitably transform with time, place, 
and circumstance. Crusoe's isolated biopolitical project of immunological improvement 
and H.F. 's resilience and editorial objectivity in the face of imminent death are ultimately 
reflections of being subjects of and subjected to (authors of and authored from) the 
inevitably frequent vicissitudes of life itself that have the power to help readers 
"recognize in their governed lives our own biopolitical condition" (De Boever 47). 
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